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STRENGTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

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STRENGTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

By the Honorable Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

INTRODUCTION

The most unfortunate political phenomenon in the 20th century has been the rise to international power of the Communist movement.

From the smallest beginnings of a few doctrinaire zealots, communism has grown to such vast proportions as to threaten the freedom of the world. Moreover, under the cloud of the atomic and the hydrogen bombs, it threatens the very survival of western civilization, as we know it.

It is for the purpose of presenting a summary of the strength of the Communist movements throughout the world that this study has been compiled from official Government sources.

This study was prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Security Affairs because the subcommittee believes that an accurate understanding of worldwide Communist power is essential to a review of America's future international relations. Such an understanding can be gained not through sweeping global generalizations, but first through detailed review, country by country, region by region, and then through integrating the fragments into a whole picture.

So important is this approach in the eyes of the subcommittee members that Senator Guy M. Gillette, of Iowa, has suggested that a review of this nature should be made not just once but periodically. Similarly, Senator Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, has urged a continuing study of Communist activity throughout the world. As chairman of the subcommittee, I fully concur with their views.

LIMITATIONS ON STUDY

The basic material in this study consists therefore of two parts:

1. Statistics on the parliamentary status of Communist parties, their claimed or estimated membership, and a brief statement concerning their source of strength.

2. A region-by-region analysis of the objectives and tactics of communism.

Because of the brevity of this study, it does not purport to constitute anything but a limited review of this vast field. It does not, for example, examine at any length the huge area of fellow-traveler support.

In any event, political conditions vary so much, country by country, and region by region, that it can hardly be expected that a few descriptive lines or paragraphs can adequately portray the political story of a land or region. That story changes moreover so fast that some of

the material compiled in this report as of 4 months ago may already be somewhat obsolete.

A number of observations may, however, be made concerning the data presented herein.

COMMUNISM'S GROWTH

1. Perhaps the most basic impression which will arise from this study is the very rapid growth of the Communist movement.

At the beginning of 1917, the Bolsheviks represented an extremist offshoot of the Russian Social Democratic Party. They numbered some 80,000 adherents within the Russian Empire and small numbers of supporters abroad. They had little direct influence on the political events of their time.

Within less than four decades, the Communists grew in strength until today, they control governments of one-third of the population and one-fourth of the area of the world. The Communist movement consists, moreover, of a vast network of national Communist Parties with some 24 million members operating in more than 60 countries.

This network feeds and is fed by a tremendous variety of national and international mass organizations, playing direct and indirect roles, wittingly or unwittingly, in the global Communist conspiracy for world dominion.

Therefore, for anyone at this late hour to underestimate the strength of the Communist movement is to be making not only a serious blunder of evaluation, but is to be guilty of what could prove to be a suicidal blindness. This is particularly true, in view of the Soviet military potential.

COMMUNISM'S REPEATED COMEBACKS

2. A second impression from this study is the apparent ability of the Communist movement within many countries and regions to survive all sorts of adversity due to governmental and private opposition.

The sheer fanaticism of the Communist adherents has enabled them to withstand shocks to which other less zealous movements might long since have completely succumbed.

Moreover, just as the Communists have proven their ability to survive internal legal attack, the Communist movement has proven its ability to survive external shock waves emanating from within the Kremlin itself. These shock waves have arisen out of the periodic purges which convulse Soviet society.

Again and again, many anti-Communists have been guilty of the error of assuming that a particular historic purge has "completely and permanently" disorganized the Soviet conspiracy throughout the world.

While purges have indeed caused disorganization, while countless lives have been snuffed out within Russia and in other countries, invariably the Communist movement has proven its ability to make impressive comebacks.

In any event, the history of the Communist growth has been neither steady nor gradual. It has consisted of 1-, 2-, or 3-year spurts during periods of extreme social disorganization and change. The last and most significant period was that following World War II when Com-

munist leaders came to share and/or seize political power in many areas of Europe and Asia and when ultimate Communist ambitions exploded in direct military ventures, as in southeast Asia.

But in these and other lands, Communist success has alternated with Communist failure. Often, after Communist political parties have grown in strength, they have been outlawed, gone underground, only to reemerge at a later date under some new guise and sometimes as strong or stronger than before.

The Communist leaders, trained and toughened in the hard Soviet schools of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, have proven themselves past masters at "holding out" during long periods of repression. That fact should be borne in mind in those lands where populations may come to feel complacent over legal steps taken against the Communist conspiracy.

COMMUNIST HOLD ON LABOR MOVEMENT

3. A third basic fact which emerges from the study is communism's emphasis on what it calls its "proletarian base."

In country after country, the principal growth of the Communist cancer may be found centered within the labor union movement. This is particularly true of industrialized societies. In underdeveloped countries, the Communists make every effort to promote industrialization. They do so, not as a means of improving the standard of living of the people, but in order to provide a larger proletariat from which the Communists hope, in accordance with their dogma, to draw increased strength.

The continued Communist ability to distort the rightful role of a free labor movement is a factor to give deep cause for concern to all friends of the rights of laboring men and laboring women.

It is a challenge to working people in all lands to resist the treacherous Communist appeals to class warfare and to unite with all other groups in the population in opposing Communist efforts.

THE FALLACY OF NUMBERS

4. Another factor which is soon noted is that in seeking to appraise Communist strength, one may quickly fall victim to what may be called a fallacy of numbers—small numbers or large numbers.

One may mistakenly assume that, because a Communist Party has won only a small number of seats in a particular parliament, that communism is not an important factor to be reckoned with in the political life of that land.

This notion is fallacious for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the Communists have time and again proven the extent to which even a small, highly disciplined group inside or outside a parliament (indeed, in virtually any organization) can succeed in a wrecking operation.

Secondly, the Communists in many instances prefer to keep the Communist Party as such, a small, tight "elite" organization. They often prefer to leave to mass, non-Communist parties and organizations, the principal overt task of moving the society in the direction the Communists want it to go.

Frequently, the Communists, by throwing strength at crucial times to left-wing Socialist groups, can far better attain an immediate goal, e. g., neutralism in a nation and/or their ultimate goal, communism, than if the Communists were to seek those objectives openly under their own auspices.

In the third place, in underdeveloped countries in particular, where there is a relative paucity of educated leaders, a mere handful of highly articulate Communist MP's can wield strength, inside or outside a parliament, totally disproportionate to their actual strength.

In these lands, moreover, the Communists have proven that at a convenient time, a bullet fired by a hired assassin can often deprive a nation of a responsible, key prodemocratic leader and can thereby set the stage for Communists or their fellow travelers to take over.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that under the quickly changeable conditions of today, a small Communist minority can become a Communist majority within but a short period of time.

Oftimes some observers profess to be surprised when communism "breaks out" in a particular area, as, for example, when it won its recent parliamentary majority in British Guiana. Actually a closer analysis will show how a particular "outbreak," far from being sudden, actually represents the fruit of years of industrious work by picked Communist agitators.

There is another basic aspect to the fallacy of numbers: that is to fall victim to the mistaken notion that a large Communist vote in a particular country means that a major fraction of the electorate has been "irretrievably" lost to the Communist cause.

This concept is also obviously erroneous from several standpoints.

In the first place, very often, large Communist votes, as in France and Italy, represent not so much pro-Communist votes, as antigovernment votes. They are ballots cast largely out of a traditional sense of protest against almost any incumbent government.

Since a vote for communism represents the most extreme form of protest, many people vote the Communist ticket for that purpose, although they are not actually Communists in their thinking. They may, in particular, admire the usual Communist aggressiveness in pushing for some immediate objective, e. g., higher wages, while actually disapproving long-range Communist goals.

In the second place, Communists have often proven their ability to bring out large votes by tactics of terror and coercion. Thus, a sizable Communist Party vote in a particular city or province may constitute a tribute not so much to mass devotion to Communist cause, but rather to the effectiveness of Communist goon squads in terrorizing the opposition.

TIMETABLE DIFFERS IN VARIOUS LANDS

In guarding against the fallacy of numbers, it should be remembered that the master planners of the worldwide Communist movement in Moscow plan different objectives for different countries and regions at particular times.

While ultimately the global objective is the same—the attainment of absolute power—yet in a given period, in a given place, the tactics and objectives may vary widely.

In one land, the Communists may be instructed to conduct a united front operation in which the Communist Party seems to take a back seat.

In another country, because the stage of the Communist timetable is different, the Communists may be ordered into the open to conduct violent street warfare, preparatory toward actually overthrowing a particular regime.

In still another land, where Communist resources are completely negligible, the party may not seem to exist at all, but may be engaged in a relatively quiet, long-range operation of indoctrination.

A basic distinction, moreover, to be borne in mind is that in accordance with the principles of Lenin, in every country there was ordered to be both a legal and illegal Red apparatus.

Everywhere the illegal operation represents for the Kremlin the highest priority. The effectiveness of the undergound is the ultimate index of Communist success in that country. Thus, the limited electoral attainments of the Communist Party in Great Britain can hardly compare to the shocking accomplishment of the Communists in securing the defection of such key atomic scientists as Drs. Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo and of diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean.

The first named two individuals have undoubtedly changed the historical pattern of events in this century.

And so, in reviewing Communist activity, country by country, and region by region, it must be remembered that each Communist unit is but a pawn on the world chessboard for the Kremlin's conspirators.

A particular move on any one part of that chessboard becomes meaningful only in terms of analysis:

(*a*) Of individual conditions in that area, and—

(*b*) Overall operations of the Communist conspiracy throughout the world.

EXPOSING COMMUNIST CONTRADICTIONS

5. Another pattern which emerges in reviewing this report is the cunning Communist misuse of nationalism and other emotional themes in order to attain their objectives.

It is especially ironic that a movement so completely subservient to dictation from outside the borders of every land (except the Soviet Union) should achieve such incredible success in its false parading under the nationalist banner.

The Communist assertion of its devotion to nationalism is but one of the endless series of inherent lies on which communism is based.

Some people may think that communism will "automatically choke" of its own contradictions. But a more careful analysis shows that only the most relentless exposure of those contradictions can undermine the Communist movement.

Thus, anti-Communist forces throughout the world must endlessly document the fundamental contradictions of the Communists in all such instances as,

(*a*) Their striving for a philosophy of unmitigated atheism in countries deeply devoted to God.

(*b*) Their agitating for support by peasants of a philosophy which actually will give the peasants neither their own land nor their own bread, and—

(*c*) Their playing on war weariness and pacificism on behalf of a philosophy addicted to perpetual violence.

These and other lies and contradictions must be exposed again and again to the people. This must be accomplished in ways and with techniques that are as simple, as meaningful, and as memorable as the Communists themselves have proven so adept at using.

COMMUNISM'S ADAPTABILITY TO VARYING SITUATIONS

Another and justified basic impression from the report is communism's apparent universal adaptability.

Like a "snake oil" which is claimed to cure any ailment, depending on the malady of the particular listener, communism is represented in such a way that it may be all things to all men.

Communism has proven its ability to attract an intellectual, teaching in a great university of a metropolis, as well as an illiterate peasant, halfway around the world, engaging in brutal jungle warfare.

Communism has proven its ability cunningly to construct diverse appeals to virtually every group in society, to countries at all levels of social, political, economic, and industrial organization, to peoples of every creed, every race, and every color.

COMMUNISTS NO SUPERGROUP

Lest any individual, however, fall victim of any foolish belief as to the "invincibility" of the Communist cause, let it be pointed out that in country after country, communism has severely blundered again and again.

It has repeatedly misjudged the intelligence, courage, and love of freedom of its own slave and satellite peoples and of foreign peoples. Its slogans have often backfired; its record has risen to plague it. It has allowed historic opportunities to slip from its grasp.

In addition to setbacks which it has experienced because of its own mistakes, it has been hard hit by enlightened action against it conducted by free peoples, both individually and collectively.

Thus far, moreover, communism reveals an intrinsic weakness in that it is not able to control countries that are not contiguous to other Communist countries.

Like all totalitarian philosophies, the facade of Communist strength invariably hides a structure ridden with decay and split with a variety of bitter tensions and hatreds.

The Communist Party, while supposedly monolithic, even in lands which it does not control, has suffered on occasion from "heretical" splinter movements. Basically, it has fallen victim in all lands to the chronic ill to which all totalitarian movements are heir—endless battles for personal power.

All this however offers no cause for complacency on our part. It does offer good and sufficient reason for redoubling our efforts in conjunction with other peoples to defend our freedoms.

COMMUNISM WILL NOT DEFEAT ITSELF

In any event, let it never be forgotten that communism will not defeat itself.

Virtually no single country taken over by communism has in this century freed itself from Communist clutches.

Communism, once enthroned, brings to bear all of the immense powers of a police state to preserve itself. Its possession of the lightning techniques of modern communication and transportation makes armed insurrection exceedingly improbable, except through defections in the armed forces.

That even the lack of weapons cannot, however, deter the heart of oppressed people is the clear significance of recent news from within the Iron Curtain.

To what extent however the boiling ferment in the satellite area may weaken the worldwide Communist apparatus, if at all, remains to be seen.

As for ourselves, we can only continue to rely upon our steadfast vigilance if we would, with assurance, maintain the citadel of our liberty.

It is with the hope that this summary may constitute a helpful guidepost in the analysis and combating of the Communist movement that it is presented. The study was compiled under the supervision of Julius N. Cahn, committee counsel.

ALEXANDER WILEY.

October 1953.

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
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
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MONGOLIA
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SOUTHERN RHODESIA
MOZAMBIQUE
MADAGASCAR
Mauritius
Réunion
INDIAN OCEAN
NEW HEBRIDES IS.
SAMOA IS.
Fiji IS.
New Caledonia
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
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NEW ZEALAND
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PRINCE EDWARD IS.
CROZET IS.
KERGUELEN IS.
BOUNTY IS.
ANTIPODES IS.
AUCKLAND IS.
MACQUARIE IS.
BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 1952 (including de facto boundaries and limits of administration)
1937 boundary of Poland, the Baltic States, and Japan
The Government of the United States has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, nor does it recognize as final the de facto western line of Polish Administration in Germany (the Oder-Neisse Line); some other effective boundaries do not necessarily correspond to the boundaries recognized by the United States Government.

DATA ON THE STRENGTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

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British Commonwealth of Nations *

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center parties	Conservative		
United Kingdom, October 1951.	Communist Party: 21,640 votes (0.07 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 13,949,105 votes (48.7 percent), 295 seats (47.2 percent).	Liberal Party: 730,552 votes (2.5 percent), 6 seats (0.9 percent). Independents: 177,329 votes (0.6 percent), 3 seats (0.5 percent).	Conservative Party and Allies: 13,730,642 votes (48.0 percent), 321 seats (including 4 uncontested constituencies in Northern Ireland) (51.4 percent).	34,801 (claim, April 1953).	The Communist Party has a small membership. It has been excluded from Labor Party affiliation, has persistently failed to win local government elections, and has lost all representation in Parliament. Although Communists continue to exploit relatively important positions in such unions as the National Union of Mineworkers, Amalgamated Engineers, and National Union of Railwaymen as well as their positions as shop stewards in factories, their influence has been curtailed in individual unions by a sustained anti-Communist campaign on the part of the Trades Union Congress. Security precautions against Communist activitives in important civil-service posts, especially atomic research, have been increased.
Canada, June 1949....	Labor Progressive Party: 32,623 votes (0.6 percent), no seats.	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation: 782,410 votes (13.4 percent), 13 seats (5.0 percent).	Liberal Party: 2,886,365 votes (49.3 percent), 192 seats (73.3 percent). Independents: 193,077 votes (3.3 percent), 6 seats (2.3 percent).	Progressive Conservative Party: 1,734,081 votes (29.6 percent), 41 seats (15.6 percent). Social Credit Party: 135,217 votes (2.3 percent), 10 seats (3.8 percent). Union d'Electeurs: 85,198 votes (1.5 percent), no seats.	10,000 (estimate 1952).	Since the exposure in 1947 of Soviet espionage in Canada, the Labor Progressive Party—Canada's Communist Party—has declined in national, provincial, and municipal elections. In the 1945 general elections, Communist candidates polled 112,195 votes compared to a mere 32,623 in 1949. Canadian Communists are extremely active, however, among the foreign-language groups. They also have extensively organized "cultural" front organizations and continue to be active in a number of unions in the strategic electronics, shipbuilding, and mining-milling-smelting industries. The 3 chief Communist-dominated unions are the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelters Workers, and the International Fur and Leather Workers, all of which have been expelled from the Canadian Congress of Labor. The Maritime Shipbuilding

						Workers Federation on the Atlantic coast and the Vancouver Marine and Boilermakers Union on the Pacific coast are also Communist-led, but as yet have not been expelled from their respective national federations.
Australia, April 1951	Communist Party: 45,759 votes (0.95 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 2,162,379 votes (46.5 percent), 54 seats.	None	Liberal and Country Parties: 2,310,973 votes (49.6 percent), 69 seats (56 percent).	6,000 (estimate)	Communist influence is concentrated in the Australian labor union movement. Party members hold some key offices in transport, mining, and heavy industry unions, but in the last 3 years anti-Communist groups within the unions have ousted most and limited the manipulative power of other Communist officials.
New Zealand, September 1951.	Communist Party: 476 votes (0.4 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 448,017 votes (46.20 percent), 33 seats (41 percent).	do	National Party: 520,419 votes (53.62 percent), 47 seats (59 percent).	500 (estimate)	The Communists have very little electoral strength. Moreover, in most unions Communist influence is now slight, and the Communists no longer dominate any national union.
Union of South Africa,* April 1953.	Communist Party: No candidates entered, no seats except for 1 representing Cape natives.	Labor Party: 34,730 votes (2.9 percent), 4 seats (2.6 percent).	United Party: 576,074 votes (47.5 percent), 57 seats (36 percent).	Nationalist Party: 598,297 votes (49.5 percent), 94 seats (59 percent).	1,000-2,000 (estimate).	The Communist Party is now an illegal organization and has declared itself dissolved. Members are active in native and colored labor unions, several small European labor unions, the Springbok Legion of Veterans, and Indian Congress and colored organizations. They are also active in the passive resistance campaign against discriminatory laws.
Ireland,* May 1951	Communist Party: No official Communist Party exists.	Labor Party: 152,231 votes (11.4 percent), 16 seats. Clann na Poblachta: 54,210 votes (4.1 percent), 2 seats (1.4 percent).	Fianna Fail: 617,570 votes (46.3 percent), 69 seats (46.9 percent). Independents: 128,529 votes (9.6 percent), 14 seats (9.5 percent).	Fine Gael: 342,844 votes (25.7 percent), 40 seats (27.2 percent). Clann na Talmhan: 38,872 votes (2.9 percent), 6 seats (4.1 percent).	150 (estimate)	There is no official Communist Party. Principal Communist group is small Irish Workers League (membership about 100). No prominent trade union leader is known to be a Communist. Communists are active in a few front organizations, but have extremely small following and public influence.

* See also p. 29 below for other members of the British Commonwealth.

Northern Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center parties	Conservative		
Iceland, Oct. 23, 1949.	Workingman's United Front—the Socialist Party: 14,077 votes (19.5 percent), 9 seats (17.3 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 11,938 votes (16.5 percent), 7 seats [1] (13.5 percent).	Progressive Party: 17,659 votes (24.5 percent), 17 seats [1] (32.7 percent).	Conservative Party: 28,546 votes (39.5 percent), 19 seats (36.5 percent).	950 (estimate)---	Through exploitation of nationalism and attention to the material demands of workers, the Community Party has become the 3d largest political organization in the country. Although the Communists lost control of the Central Labor Federation in November 1948, they retain control over approximately one-third of the total trade-union membership, including that of Iceland's largest single union (Dagsbrun), which is composed of unskilled workers. Communist influence is also strong among a significant minority of the intellectuals. Although the party lost 1 seat in the legislature, its popular vote remained unchanged in the national election of October 1949.
Denmark, Apr. 21, 1953.	Communist Party: 99,024 votes (4.8 percent), 7 seats (4.6 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 836,329 votes (40.4 percent), 61 seats (40.4 percent).	Radical Liberal Party: 178,906 votes (8.7 percent), 13 seats (8.6 percent).	Moderate Liberal Party: 455,200 votes (22 percent), 33 seats (22.9 percent). Justice Party: 116,322 votes (5.6 percent), 9 seats (6 percent). Conservative Party: 358,720 votes (17.3 percent), 26 seats (17.2 percent).	16,000 (estimate).	After having won 255,236 votes in 1945 (12.5 percent of the total vote) and 18 parliamentary seats, the party's voting strength declined to about 100,000 votes in 1950, where it appears to have been more or less stabilized. Communist voting strength is concentrated mainly in the cities, with about 50 percent drawn from Copenhagen alone. Other principal centers are to be found in the major cities of the islands and Jutland. Although the Communists control none of the 75 national trade unions in Denmark, they do have varying degrees of strength in a number of the locals, particularly among the dockworkers as well as among the construction, metal, and unskilled workers.
Norway, Oct. 10, 1949.	Communist Party: 102,722 votes (5.8 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 803,471 votes (45.7 percent), 85 seats (56.7 percent).	Liberal and Christian People's Party: 365,934 votes (20.8 percent), 30 seats (20 percent).	Agrarian and Conservative Parties: 365,208 votes (20.8 percent), 35 seats (23.3 percent). Conservative Party: 279,790 votes (15.91 percent), 23 seats.	7,500 (estimate).	Communist voting strength has declined from 11.9 percent in 1945, the peak of Communist electoral support, to 5.8 percent in 1949. Since then Communist voting strength, as revealed by the municipal elections of 1951, appears to have leveled off. Party membership has also declined, dropping from around

				Agrarian Party: 85,418 votes (4.86 percent), 12 seats.		40,000 at the end of the war to about 7,000 or 8,000 at the end of 1952. Communist voting strength is widely distributed throughout Norway and is roughly in proportion to population density. Communists control none of the 41 national trade unions making up the Norwegian Federation of Labor. Among the union locals their most important areas of infiltration include the building trades, iron and metal workers, paper-industry workers, transport workers, wood-industry workers, and electric and power-station workers.
Sweden, Sept. 21, 1952.	Communist Party: 167,295 votes (4.4 percent), 5 seats (2.2 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 1,739,227 votes (46 percent), 110 seats (47.9 percent).	Liberal Party: 929,829 votes (24.6 percent), 59 seats (25.7 percent). Agarian Party: 405,910 votes (10.7 percent), 25 seats (10.9 percent).	Conservative Party: 538,484 votes (14.2 percent), 31 seats (13.5 percent).	30,000 (estimate).	The Communist Party of Sweden appears to have been reduced very nearly to its core of loyal followers. As a result of the parliamentary elections held Sept. 21, 1952, it lost 3 of its 8 seats in the lower house and declined to 4.4 in percent of the total vote. Its electoral position is now comparable to that in 1940 when its prestige was also at a low ebb and it secured only 3.5 percent of the total vote. The strategically located iron mining region of Norbotten in northern Sweden remains the center of highest Communist concentration with 17.3 percent of the vote cast going to the Communist Party in the 1952 election compared to 11.2 percent for Göteborg and 6.7 percent for Stockholm, the 2d and 3d most important Communist centers, respectively, in Sweden.
Finland, July 2-3, 1951.	Democratic Union (SKDL): 391,362 votes (21.45 percent), 43 seats (21.5 percent).	Social Democrats: 480,754 votes (26.32 percent), 53 seats (26.5 percent).	Agrarians: 421,613 votes (23.18 percent), 51 seats (25.5 percent). Swedish People's: 137,171 votes (7.52 percent), 15 seats (7.5 percent).	Conservative Coalition: 264,044 votes (14.56 percent), 28 seats (14 percent). Finnish National Party: 102.933 votes (5.57 percent), 10 seats (5 percent).	30,000-50,000 (estimate, probably nearer 30,000). Over 50,000 (claim in November 1951).	The membership of the Communist Party probably remained stationary during 1952 although the IX Congress of the Finnish Communist Party held in November 1951 called for an enlargement of the mass basis of the party. The Social Democrats retained control of the Central Federation of Trade Unions (SAK), maintaining their position among the rank and file and in some cases increasing their organizational strength. The Communists remained outside the Government and were unsuccessful in their attempt to disrupt the Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition. In the parliamentary election of July 1951 the Communists made only slight gains.

[1] At by-election held September 1952, Social Democratic Party lost 1 seat which was picked up by the Progressive Party.

Eastern Europe (Communist countries)

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist-controlled bloc	Non-Communist opposition		
Albania, May 28, 1950.	Democratic front: 626,005 votes (98.18 percent), 121 seats (100 percent).	11573 votes (1.82 percent), blank ballots.	44,418 regular and candidate members (official claim, March 1952).	The Albanian Workers' Party (Communist) dominates the Democratic Front, and through it controls the country. Its adherents hold the key posts in the youth, women's, professional, and other organizations as well as the important offices in the government. No other political party is tolerated.
Bulgaria, Dec. 18, 1949.	Fatherland Front: 4,625,917 votes (97.59 percent), 239 seats (100 percent).	57,651 votes (1.70 percent), blank ballots.	Nearly 500,000 (official claim, Dec. 12, 1952).	The Fatherland Front is now the sole, all-embracing political organization replacing the 5 political parties of which it was originally formed. In addition to the Communist Party, the only other recognized political party is the pro-Government Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Directly or through the Fatherland Front, the Communist Party, with which the Socialist Party was fused in 1948, dominates the entire life of the country.
Czechoslovakia, May 30 1948.	Communist-sponsored single list (Communists, Czech Socialists, People's Party, Social Democrats, Slovak Party of Regeneration, Slovak Freedom Party): 6,429,000 votes (89 percent), 300 seats (100 percent).	770,000 votes (10.7 percent), blank ballots.	1,677,433 (official claim, Feb. 9, 1951).	The Communist Party seized power in the coup of February 1948. It absorbed the Social Democrats in June 1948 and, while it continues to tolerate the Czech Socialist and People's Parties in revised form, as well as the Slovak Freedom Party and the Slovak Party of Regeneration, it has a monopoly on the entire machinery of control of the state.
Hungary, May 17, 1953.	Communist-sponsored single list independent people's front (Hungarian Workers, Smallholders, National Peasants, Radical Democrats, Independent Democrats): 6,256,653 votes (98.2 percent), 298 seats (100 percent).	61,257 "No" votes (1 percent), 52,609 invalid votes (0.8 percent).	Nearly 1,000,000 (official claim, 1953).	A political coup at the end of May 1947 placed the Communists in de facto control of the Hungarian Government. Working through the facade of a coalition of "democratic" parties, the Communists and their allies now hold all of the important positions in the Government, police, and trade unions. Nearly 190,000 party members were purged during 1949–50, but many of these requalified since that time.
Poland, Oct. 26, 1952	Communist-sponsored single list (National Front): 15,459,849 votes (99.8 percent), 425 deputies and 194 alternates (100 percent).	31,321 votes (0.2 percent) blank ballots; 4,645 (0.03 percent) invalid votes.	1,130,000 estimate (based on official statement of June 15, 1952).	The Communists now have full control, having eliminated the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) by police pressure in 1947 and having got rid of the Socialists as an independent force through absorption of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in December 1948. The Communist component in the 1948 fusion was about 1,000,000 in a combined membership of 1,500,000. Aside from the merged party (United Polish Workers' Party—PZPR), the only legal political parties are 3 insignificant fellow-traveling groups calling themselves the United Peasant Party (ZSL), the Democratic Party (SD), and the Social Catholic Club (KKS).
Rumania, Nov. 30, 1952.	People's Democratic Front: 10,233,369 votes (98.84 percent), 423 seats (100 percent).	120,100 blank votes (no opposition allowed).	720,000 (claim, June 23, 1950).	The Communist Party (Rumanian Workers' Party), formed through fusion of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties in February 1948, seized power as a direct result of Soviet occupation and has had control of the country since

				1945. Communists now control the trade unions and women's and youth organizations as well as a number of allegedly independent political parties. Organized opposition has been entirely eliminated since 1947.
U. S. S. R., Mar. 12, 1950.	"Bloc of Communists and Non-Party Peoples": 110,788,377 votes (99.73 percent, for 678 seats (100 percent), Council of the Union; 110,782,009 votes (99.72 percent), for 638 seats (100 percent), Council of Nationalities.	None	6,882,145 (including candidate members: official October 1952)	The Communist Party dominates all political life in the Soviet Union. Its membership is concentrated primarily in the RSFSR. The Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR's have the next largest party membership groupings after the RSFSR. Special efforts have been made to expand party membership in the areas acquired since 1939. During the past 4 years the proportionate growth of party strength in Moldavia, Latvia, and Lithuania has been much larger than in the U. S. S. R. as a whole.
Yugoslavia, Mar. 26, 1950.	People's Front Federal Council: 9,059,113 votes (93.23 percent), 405 seats (100 percent). Council of Nationalities: 9,050,683 votes (93.42 percent), 215 seats (100 percent).	Federal Council: 657,837 votes (6.77 percent), no seats. Council of Nationalities: 637,481 votes (6.58 percent), no seats	779,382 (official claim, VI Congress, November 1952).	Under Tito's control, the Communist Party dominates the political life of Yugoslavia. The trade unions, youth, women's groups, and affiliated organizations, comprising a membership of about 8,000,000, are completely controlled by Communist leadership. Tito's control over the CPY has been such that few divergencies of significance have come to light in the controversy with the Cominform which broke out publicly in June 1948. The party name was changed to Union of Communists of Yugoslavia at the VI Congress of the CPY in November 1952.

Central Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center parties	Conservative		
Switzerland, October 1951.	Communist Party (Partei der Arbeit): 30,000 votes (4 percent), 5 seats (2.6 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 261,000 votes (26.5 percent), 49 seats (25 percent).	Radical-Democratic Party: 234,000 votes (24 percent), 51 seats (26 percent).	Catholic Conservative Party: 217,000 votes (22 percent), 48 seats (24.5 percent) Peasant Party: 117,000 votes (13 percent), 23 seats (11.7 percent).	8,000 (estimate).	The Communist Partei der Arbeit—Parti du Travail dropped from 50,000 to approximately 30,000 voters in the last 4 years. These losses were caused by intraparty strife, reduction of strength in the trade unions, failure to enlarge the Communist-front organizations, and the endorsement of the unpopular Moscow line. The Communists are unable to attract any segment of the essentially conservative Swiss population. The party is too small to endanger the internal security of the Swiss Confederacy.
Austria, February 1953.	Communist Party: 228,228 votes (5.28 percent), 4 seats (2.42 percent).	Socialist Party: 1,818,811 (42.11 percent), 73 seats (44.24 percent).	Austrian People's Party: 1,781,969 (41.26 percent), 74 seats (44.84 percent).	Union of Independents (Rightist): 473,022 (10.95 percent), 14 seats (8.48 percent). Various minor groups: 17,244 (0.40 percent), no seats.	60,000 (estimate).	Not a major party before the war, the Communist Party profited from the effective support of the Soviet occupational authorities and national chaos to win parliamentary representation for the first time in 1945. Faced with the intensive enmity of the vast majority of the Austrian people, the Communists have been unable to gain widespread support in Austrian political, social, and cultural organizations. They form a somewhat more cohesive minority in the trade unions, but control no single union and have been deprived of Trade Union Federation offices by the Socialist TUF leadership.
Germany (Soviet Zone), Oct. 15, 1950.	The following is the prearranged distribution of seats of the parties (all of which are Communist-controlled) in the East German Parliament: Socialist Unity Party (the Communist Party), 25 percent; Christian Democratic Union, 15 percent; Liberal Democratic Party, 15 percent; National Democratic Party, 7.5 percent; Democratic Peasant Party, 7.5 percent; Free German Trade Union League, 10 percent; Free German Youth, 5 percent; Democratic Women's League, 3.75 percent; Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime, 3.75 percent; Cultural League, 5 percent; Peasants' Mutual Aid Association, 1.25 percent; and consumer cooperatives, 1.25 percent.				1,400,000 (estimate) (including Berlin).	The Communist Party, called the Socialist Unity Party (SED), runs the political life of the East Zone with the support of Soviet occupation authorities. The German Democratic Republic was set up in October 1949 for the Soviet Zone and its government is completely under Communist domination. So-called non-Communists in the Cabinet are Communist tools. Communists have continued to expand their control over all phases of East German life through centralization of activities and the de-

						velopment of a strong security and police apparatus. In 1951, the SED sharply reduced the size of its membership.
Germany (Western Zones), German Federal Republic elections, Aug. 14, 1949.	Communist Party: 1,360,443 votes (5.7 percent), 15 seats (3.7 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 6,932,272 votes (29.2 percent), 131 seats (32.6 percent).	Christian Democratic Union: 7,357,579 votes (31 percent), 139 seats (34.6 percent). Center Party: 727,343 votes (3.1 percent), 10 seats, (2.5 percent).	Free Democratic Party, German Party, Bavarian Party, Economic Reconstruction Association, German Reich Party, etc.: 7,346,472 votes (31 percent), 107 seats (26.6 percent).	130,000	The West German Communist Party (KPD) is of minor electoral significance and its membership has fallen off since 1946. Whatever political significance it has stems from the fact that it is a tool of the East German regime. Communism is still relatively strongest in its traditional areas of strength—the Ruhr, Hamburg, Bremen, and Mannheim. It retains some strength among certain segments of the working population such as the metalworkers and the dockworkers, although it has now been deprived of participation in trade-union management.
Germany, Berlin City assembly elections, Dec. 3, 1950.	Communist Party: The Socialist Unity Party did not participate in the elections which were held in the western sectors of Berlin only.	Social Democratic Party: 654,211 votes (44.7 percent), 61 seats (48.0 percent).	Christian Democratic Union: 361,050 votes (24.6 percent), 34 seats (26.8 percent). Free Democratic Party: 337,589 votes (23 percent), 32 seats (25.2 percent).	German Party: 53,810 votes (3.7 percent). Refugee Party: 31,918 votes (2.2 percent). Miscellaneous: 25,892 votes (1.8 percent).	70,000 (estimate)	The Berlin SED is, for all practical purposes, an integral part of the East Zone SED, and as such, operates within the SED pattern. Although it is active to some extent in West Berlin, the party has been unable to attract any following of consequence there. Like its parent organization in the Soviet Zone, the Berlin SED probably thinned its ranks during 1951 as a result of the general screening process.

Western Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center parties	Conservative		
Netherlands, June 1952.	Communist Party: 328,571 votes (6.16 percent), 6 seats.	Labor Party: 1,545,414 votes (28.97 percent), 30 seats (30 cent).	Catholic People's Party: 1,529,464 votes (28.67 percent), 30 seats (30 percent).	Calvinist Parties, Freedom and Democracy Party, Catholic National Party: 1,824,018 votes (34.19 percent), 34 seats (34 percent).	33,000 (estimate).	In the national elections of June 1952, the Communist Party reached its lowest level in both popular vote and parliamentary representation since the elections of 1937. The most striking postwar losses occurred in the 1949 municipal elections when 102 Communist council seats were lost and in the 1950 provincial elections when the Communists lost 27 seats. The continuing decline in Communist strength is due mainly to the rapid economic recovery of the Netherlands, the lack of success of the Communist-dominated EVC Labor Federation, general distrust of Communist motives since Korea, and the strict adherence to the Moscow line by the Dutch Communists. The main centers of Communist strength are in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague where the Communists polled, respectively, 22.36, 9.6, and 6.6 percent of the total vote in the 1952 national elections.
Belgium, June 4, 1950.	Communist Party: 234,541 votes (4.7 percent), 7 seats 3.3 percent.	Socialist Party: 1,70o,781 votes (34.5 percent), 77 seats (36.3 percent).	Socialist Christian Party: 2,356,608 votes (47.7 percent), 108 seats (50.9 percent).	Liberal Party: 556,102 votes (11.3 percent), 20 seats (9.4 percent).	30-35,000 (estimate).	In the national elections of June 1950, the Belgian Communist Party's popular vote and parliamentary representation fell to the lowest level since 1932. Communist strength in the labor movement is at its lowest postwar level. The industrial areas of Liege and Hainaut Province remain the primary centers of party strength. Communists have been eliminated from positions of control in the Socialist trade-union federation (Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB). The Communists, however, retain some local strength within the FGTB, primarily in its public-service union, and, to a lesser extent, among the dockers, metallurgists, and white-collar workers. In the communal elections of October 1952 the Communists (in the 148

						communes of 10,000 population and over where most of their strength is located) won 58 seats as compared with 185 in 1946, and their total vote declined from 228,431 in 1946 to 113,466 in 1952.
Luxembourg, June 3, 1951.	Communist Party: 4 seats (3 percent).[1]	Socialist Party: 19 seats (32 percent).	Christian Social Party: 21 seats (44 percent).	Democratic group: 8 seats (21 percent).	500 (estimate)	Communist strength in Luxembourg is concentrated almost entirely in the southern industrial districts and in the mining-iron, and steel trade unions. In the June 1951 elections held in the northern and central districts for half of the members of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Communists lost their only contested seat, or ⅕ of their parliamentary representation, and received 50 percent less of the popular vote than in 1945. The decline in Communist influence in the country as a whole, moreover, was reflected in the communal elections of October 1951 when the Communists lost 12 of the 23 local seats which they have held since 1945.
France, June 17, 1951 (seat distribution in National Assembly as of January 1953).	Communist Party: 4,926,530 votes (25.7 percent), 100 seats (16 percent).	Socialist Party: 2,794,214 votes (14.6 percent), 105 seats (17 percent).	Popular Republican movement: 2,353,544 votes (12.3 percent), 89 seats (14 percent). Left Rally (Radical Socialists and U. D. S. R.): 2,194,213 votes (11.5 percent), 98 seats (15 percent).	Gaullists: 4,134,885 votes (21.6 percent), 85 seats (13 percent). Right-Wing group (Peasants, Independent Republicans, and former Gaullists): 2,496,570 votes (13.1 percent), 134 seats (21 percent).	450,000 (estimate).	The French Communist Party is strong, particularly in electoral strength and trade-union support. At the polls it is the largest single political party and in the labor movement it controls the largest labor union. It also continues to operate numerous front organizations, although many of these are now "paper" organizations, and it has an extensive party press. Nevertheless, the decline of the French Communist Party as measured in actual membership and, above all, in political influence, has been very considerable since 1947–48, and this decline is continuing. During these past several years the Communists have been unable to carry off successfully mass demonstrations or political strikes, thus showing that the great majority of the persons who vote Communist or belong to the Communist-dominated trade union will not participate in political actions called for by the party. Moreover, the party is completely isolated from all the other political parties in Parliament. The party has also been displaying signs of internal disunity, as seen particularly in the Marty-Tillon case of the past year. Its activities are also being increasingly curbed by the Government's anti-Communist measures, including recent arrests of a number of top Communist leaders.

[1] Percentage of the total vote.

Western Europe—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center parties	Conservative		
Italy, June 7-8, 1953: Chamber of Deputies, seats as of July 2, 1953.	Communist Party (PCI) and allied Left-Wing Socialists (PSI): PCI, 6,120,709 votes (22.6 percent), 143 seats (24.2 percent); PSI, 3,441,014 votes (12.7 percent), 75 seats (12.7 percent).	Social Democratic Party (PSDI): 1,222,957 votes (4.5 percent), 19 seats (3.2 percent).	Christian Democratic Party (DC): 10,984,547 votes (40.6 percent), 265 seats (44.9 percent). Republican Party (PRI): 438,149 votes (1.6 percent), 5 seats (0.8 percent). Liberal Party (PLI): 815,929 votes (3.0 percent), 14 seats (2.4 percent).	National Monarchist Party (PNM): 1,854,850 votes (6.9 percent), 40 seats (6.8 percent). Italian Social Movement (MSI) (Fascist): 1,579,880 votes (5.8 percent), 29 seats (4.9 percent).	1,700,000 (estimate); 2,130,000 (claim, November 1952).	The Communists (PCI), supported by the Left-Wing (Nenni) Socialists (PSI), dominate the political left in Italy. Despite some membership losses in recent years they have continued to gain in electoral support. In the national elections of June 7-8, 1953, the 2 parties rose to 35.3 percent of the valid vote from 34.7 percent in the 1951-52 local elections and 31.0 percent in the 1948 parliamentary elections. Communist and Nenni Socialist elements control the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), which remains the largest trade-union organization in Italy despite the competition of the non-Communist labor groups which have appeared since 1948. The Communists also dominate a number of important front organizations. The Communist Youth Federation claimed 455,000 members (November 1952). While the membership strength of the PCI proper has declined only slightly over the past 2 years, the size of the Youth Federation fluctuated considerably during this period. Communist strength is concentrated primarily in the urban industrial areas of northern Italy and in the agricultural regions of Emilia and Tuscany. The poverty-stricken south, however, contributed the largest gains to the party's electoral strength between 1948 and 1953, while the Communists' voting support in the north has been more or less stabilized.
Greece, Nov. 16, 1952.	United Democratic Left (EDA): 179,679 votes (11.4 percent), no seats in Parliament. (For all practical	Socialists cooperated with the center.	EPEK-Liberal Party Coalition: 577,678 votes (36.6 percent), 61 seats.	Greek Rally (Papagos): 779,982 votes (49.3 percent), 239 seats.	Communists claim anywhere from 90,000 to 400,000 members. Non-Com-	The Communist Party (KKE) and its principal organs (EAM, EPON, ERGAS and press) were outlawed on Dec. 27, 1947. After the defeat of the Communist guerrilla forces in August 1949, the KKE developed a legal front known as the

	purposes the KKE regained legal status through its front, EDA.)					munist sources put the figures as low as 20,000.	United Democratic Left (EDA), which has been voicing the Communist line since the elections of March 1950. The principal KKE propaganda and communication instrument is the clandestine radio Free Greece operating from behind the Iron Curtain. EDA has its daily press organ published legally in Athens under the name Avgi. In the elections of 1952 held under the majority system, EDA ran its own ticket in 61 of the 99 electoral districts, but failed to elect any 1 of its 186 candidates. In the 1951 elections, EDA polled 180,640 votes (10.6 percent) and elected 10 deputies to Parliament. In 1952 the Communist vote showed an increase of about 1 percent. The actual voting strength of the Greek Communists is probably not less than 12 percent of the electorate. The top leadership of the KKE is outside Greece, behind the Iron Curtain, from where it directs EDA.
Spain	The Spanish regime is a coalition of conservative groups under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Franco. These groups consist of the Falange, the only legal party or movement, the army, the church and the conservative business and landholding classes. A majority of the members of the Cortes, or Parliament, are appointed by Franco from among these groups.					10,000 (estimate)	The Spanish Communist Party is outlawed but engages in some clandestine activities. Traditionally, it has had to contend with the anti-Communist sentiments of the vast majority of the Spanish people, including those also opposed to the present regime, the hostility of the Government and its security forces, and dissension within its own ranks.
Portugal	Portugal is governed by an authoritarian regime under the control of Prime Minister Salazar. Only 1 legal party, the National Union, is allowed to function. All members of the National Assembly, the Portuguese Parliament, are members of the National Union movement.					4,000 (estimate)	Communist success in Portugal has been negligible because of the stability and anti-Communist character of the regime, the strict supervision and repression of subversive forces and the anti-Communist convictions of the overwhelming majority of the people. Attempts by the Communist Party to infiltrate other organizations has resulted in the discrediting or outlawing of these groups.

North Africa

Country	National parliamentary strength	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Algeria, Apr. 4, 1948, and Feb. 4, 1951; first elected in 1948, half of its membership was replaced in February 1951.	Algeria, as a part of the French Republic, is represented in the French National Assembly by 30 deputies 2 of whom are Communists. In the Algerian Assembly, a local organ with limited fiscal powers, only 1 member bears the Communist Party label, but there may be other Communists in "progressive" groups represented in the Assembly.	15,000 (estimate)	The Communist position in Algeria remains extremely weak. Nationalist leaders in Algeria, however, are more receptive to the Communist approach than are the nationalists in Morocco and Tunisia and have agreed on the revival of a united front with the Communists, which has not been effective in practice.
Tunisia	There is neither a national parliament nor representation in the French National Assembly.	4,000 (estimate)	The Communists in Tunisia have been more successful among Europeans than among Moslems, since the nationalist parties have secured the loyalty of the majority of the Tunisian Moslems. Both the Communist Party and the Communist-dominated labor union, USTT, are relatively weak in Tunisia. USTT in particular continues to lose ground to the nationalist union, UGTT, now the principal labor force in Tunisia. Both the nationalist party and labor union are now refusing to cooperate with the Communists; the nationalist union has withdrawn from WFTU and affiliated with ICFTU. Most of the Communist Party's top leaders have been under arrest and its French and Arabic language weeklies suspended since March 1952.
French Morocco	There is neither a national parliament nor representation in the French National Assembly. The Communist Party is illegal.	do	The Moroccan Communist Party has continued to decline seriously in strength both among Europeans and Moslems, and has made no headway in persuading the nationalist parties to form a common front with them. Moslem laborers, legally prohibited from forming or joining labor unions, continue under governmental toleration to join the Communist-dominated UGSCM, the only European labor union seeking Moslem membership. Recently, however, Moroccan nationalists have gained control over a substantial number of UGSCM union offices. The Communist Party and its newspapers were outlawed in December 1952.
Spanish Morocco	No electoral system	Negligible	There is no evidence of an active, organized Communist Party, although sporadic efforts of small Communist groups are known to the public.
Libya	No Communist in Parliament	Almost none	Communist influence, strongest in a small group of Italian leftwingers active in labor unions, has declined since deportation of the chief pro-Communist Italians in November 1951.

Africa south of the Sahara

Country	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist	Conservative		
French West Africa (election of representatives for French Assembly June 17, 1951).	**No Communist representatives.**	Socialist Party (SFIO): 5 seats in National Assembly. Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA): 2 seats in National Assembly.	Various moderate and rightist groups, 13 seats.	Unavailable.	There is no public party bearing the name "Communist Party." The Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA) until 1950 was known to have very close Communist connections and often followed the Communist line, but in 1950 it officially broke relations with the Communists. However, some of the RDA chiefs and local leaders objected vigorously to the break and to the new anti-Communist line and have remained Communists. All of the territorial divisions of RDA are reported to have rallied to the new anti-Communist line of RDA after a period of considerable internal squabbling. Marxists study groups, once allied with the RDA, have virtually disintegrated since the change in RDA policy. Present indications are that the anti-Communist forces are in relatively firm control of RDA party activities and will continue to extend their control in territorial and local areas. The Communists have sought to infiltrate and gain control of the labor unions but have met with only limited success.
French Equatorial Africa (election of representatives for French Assembly June 17, 1951).	No Communist representation.	Socialist Party (SFIO): 2 seats. Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA): 1 seat.	Rassemblement du Peuple Francais: 2 seats. Union Democratique Trhadienne, 2 seats.	do	French Equatorial Africa has a Communist Party, believed to be small and limited in influence to some educated natives and Europeans. The native party, RDA, was formerly a Communist front but it broke with the Communists in 1950. Both RDA and the Communist Party are extremely weak; each ran candidates only in 1 area in the local elections for the territorial assemblies in March 1952, and they were badly beaten. The Government has for some time sought to keep known agitators out of the area.

Africa south of the Sahara

Country	National Parliamentary strength	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
British Africa: A. British West Africa: Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria. B. British Central Africa: Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland.	There are no Communist members of the legislative bodies in the trust territories, colonies, and protectorates administered under the authority of the United Kingdom Government.	Negligible; small number of isolated individuals.	In British West Africa there are no Communist-controlled organizations. West Africans studying abroad constitute the group most exposed to the influence of Communists. On their return to West Africa some echo Communist interpretations of colonial relations and Communist arguments against colonial powers because these suit their political objectives. They are not seeking to advance communism as such, however, but to achieve their nationalistic aspirations through opposing the same Western States that communism opposes. These former students and others actively opposing the British colonial governments have been given much verbal support by European Communists and a small amount of financial support, but there is no indication that they are being controlled or directed by foreign Communists. Communist literature circulates in part for the above reasons, in part because of its cheapness and the profits to be made by distributing it.
C. British East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika.	.....	.....	In Kenya the illegal East African Trade Union Congress was formerly dominated by an Indian Communist, Makhan Singh. Singh, however, has been deported to the northern part of the territory. No other leaders of the embryonic political and labor organizations are known to be Communists although they have had Communist contacts. A Uganda native residing in London, Semakula Mulumba, leader of the banned Bataka Party, 1 of the 2 organizations involved in the riots of April 1949, has adapted Communist ideology and technique to his own purposes, but he is not generally considered to be a Communist.
Belgian Congo	No electoral system or political parties exist in the Belgian Congo. The territory is administered by a governor general who is responsible to the Belgian Minister of Colonies.	None	Some disconnected Communist efforts have appeared in the Congo, but with little effective results reported to date among either Europeans or natives.
Ethiopia	Absolute monarchy with supreme power vested in the Emperor. No formal electorial system or political parties.	do	There is evidence that the Soviet Legation in Addis Ababa is conducting propaganda activities, especially among the Greek and Armenian communities, but as yet there is no known organized Communist group among the Ethiopians.
Liberia	No Communist in Parliament today	do	None.

The Near East

Country	Communist Party	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Syria	Communist Party is illegal	10,000 (estimate, January 1952).[1]	Following Soviet support of the partition of Palestine the Syrian Communist Party was officially outlawed on Dec. 17, 1947, but it continues to function as an underground organization. Since January 1951, the Syrian Communists have merged with the Lebanese Communists into 1 organization. Party efforts concentrate on Partisans of Peace activities, workers and youth organizations, minority groups, certain intellectual circles, and Arab refugees.
Lebanon	do	8,000 (estimate, January 1952).[1]	The Lebanon Communist Party, legalized in 1942, was outlawed in January 1948, but is active as an underground organization. The Partisans of Peace organizations operate legally. Since January 1951 the Lebanese Communists have merged with the Syrian Communists into a single organization. The LCP has considerable influence among certain labor organizations, youth groups, minorities, and intellectual circles. Beirut is the center of Communist propaganda activity in the Near East. Recently there has been concentration on "peace" and labor activities.
Israel, July 30, 1951. Election to the Kneset (Parliament).	27,300 votes, 5 seats. The Left Socialist Party, a splinter from Mapam headed by Moshe Sneh, has 2 seats. It generally votes with the Communist Party.	2,800 Jewish members; 900 Arab members (estimate, late 1952).	In the 1949 elections, the Israeli Communist Party received 4 seats in the 120-member Parliament. In the July 30, 1951, elections, it received 5 seats. In the Arab area Communist strength is centered in Nazareth; Haifa and Tel Aviv are the centers among the Jews. The Communist Party has recruited new members from a minority among Arabs and among Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Balkans, and Iraq.
Iraq	Communist Party is illegal	12,000 (estimate) (membership fluctuates widely).	Since 1949 the Iraqi Government has periodically arrested and imprisoned leaders of the Communist Party. Except for its Moscow-trained chief, therefore, the present leadership is young and relatively ineffective. Discipline has been difficult to maintain and splinter movements are frequent. Recruiting has been handicapped by the uncongeniality of the orthodox Communist line t Iraqis, most of whom join for motives of Arab nationalism. An even greater handicap has been that local organizations from which the Communists have sought to gain a mass following (e. g., workers' organizations and 2 opposition political parties) are themselves weak and relatively impotent in the face of Government pressure. Communist strength is derived largely from the young, urban "intelligentsia"—teachers, students, minor officials—especially when these are members of minority groups. There is a large but quiescent Partisans of Peace movement. More active front groups in the past have been the Union of Students and a Communist faction in the semiofficial Lawyers' Association, an otherwise respectable professional organization.
Jordan	do	Probably about 2,000, mainly in Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, and Bethlehem.	An unknown number of Communists entered Jordan as the result of the annexation of Arab Palestine. Communist activity has noticeably increased since this move and is largely confined to West Jordan. There are a few Communists and many sympathizers among the Palestine refugees. A weak front group, the Popular Bloc (al-Kutlah ash-Sha-biyah) appeared for the first time in 1951 with 8 candidates in 5 districts (none successful). Little Partisans of Peace activity.
Saudi Arabia	No anti-Communist legislation, but Government does not tolerate Communists.	None	No Communist activity is in evidence.
Yemen	No anti-Communist legislation known, but Government does not tolerate Communists.	None	Do.

[1] Estimates vary mainly because membership is not always broken down into separate figures for the 2 countries.

The Near East—Continued

Country	Communist Party	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Egypt	Communist Party is illegal	Less than 3,000 (estimate). No unified party organization or coordinated leadership.	The Egyptian Government suppressed all the regularly Communist-line papers in late 1952. Some of the more important Communists were arrested in January 1953 and many continue on a clandestine basis, largely among students, industrial labor, and the feminist movement, and in the foreign and minority communities. The Partisans of Peace had been the most openly active of the Communist groups.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	do	Less than 100 (estimate)	Growing evidence of some Communist activity. 15 members of the Sudan Peace Committee and the Sudan Youth Congress were found guilty by a Khartum court in May 1951 of activities connected with international communism. Communist influence is particularly strong in the Railway Workers Union.

The Middle East

Country, date of last national parliament election	Communist or Communist-controlled party	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Turkey, Sept. 16, 1951	Communist Party and all front organizations illegal.	No Communist Party members; the number of pro-Communist elements, though as a matter of conjecture, is extremely small.	Pro-Communists and other leftists have failed to obtain any significant influence in Turkey although a few pro-Communists have been active in the intellectual and industrial life of the country. The influence of pro-Communists is limited because traditional suspicion of Russian intentions makes communism unpopular in Turkey.
Iran, began Jan. 12, 1952; halted (incompleted) May 19, 1952.	Tudeh Party (declared illegal Feb. 5, 1949); Kurdish Democratic Party and Azerbaijan Democratic Party.	Tudeh Party card-carrying membership is estimated at about 20,000; active front organization participation at 80,000, approximately.	On Feb. 5, 1949, following the attempt made upon the Shah's life, the Communist-dominated Tudeh Party was declared illegal and many of its leaders were imprisoned. Subsequently 10 escaped and others were released. Activities have been continued overtly and covertly by the Tudeh Party itself, and overtly by numerous front organizations, particularly by unions, the Partisans of Peace and the Society to Combat Imperialism (formerly called Society to Fight the AIOC and then later Society to Combat Imperialist Oil Companies). The Communists have increased their strength since 1951.
Afghanistan, April 1952 National Assembly: 138 seats.	No Communist Party organization exists.	Negligible	Communism does not appear to have any noticeable popular following in Afghanistan.
Pakistan, none. 1 planned for late 1953.	Communist Party of Pakistan.	5,000 maximum (estimate)	The Communist Party of Pakistan is following a policy of building a united front against the Muslim League regime in Pakistan and against the western democracies. After earlier unsuccessful attempts to build the united front on a program of force and violence the party is currently showing preference for more constitutional methods. While the party's present program enables it to function openly, it has not resulted in the building of any united opposition under Communist leadership. The party remains as it has always been in Pakistan—a small organization with little popular support. The party is, however, believed to be in a better position today than in the summer and autumn of 1951 when its fortunes were at low ebb due to inner-party factionalism, disaffection, and Government repression growing out of the discovery in March 1951 of the Rawalpindi conspiracy, a plot to seize control of the state hatched by a few top Pakistani military officers and Communists.

South Asia

Country and date of last national parliament election	Communist or Communist-controlled party	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
India, October 1951–February 1952. House of the People: 105,987,318 votes polled; 489 elected seats and 8 appointed seats.	Communist Party of India: 4,712,009 (4.5 percent), 23 seats (4.7 percent). Forward Bloc (Marxist): 988,272 votes (0.9 percent), 1 seat. Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (Trotskyite): 393,984 votes (0.4 percent), 2 seats.	The Communist Party of India claimed in October 1951 a membership of 30,000. It is believed that the party membership has increased since then.	About 6 months before the general elections the Communist Party of India (CPI) switched over to a new political line which, abandoning insurrectionary activity, called for the formation of an anti-Congress united front of workers, peasants, and small and middle bourgeoisie. By the time the general elections were held, the new political line of the party had succeeded in calling off Government suppressions and reestablishing to a great extent inner-party unity. The Communists participated in the elections and, by playing on local grievances and shrewdly concentrating their efforts in areas where their strength was greatest, succeeded in establishing themselves as the second largest organized opposition in the national Parliament and the largest in 4 State legislatures. They won a near majority of State assembly seats in Travancore-Cochin, large minorities in both Hyderabad and Madras States, and made a sufficient showing in West Bengal to become the principal opposition in that State. The elections provided evidence of the renewed strength of the Communist Party and showed that its popular following is heavily concentrated in Travancore-Cochin and in some areas of Hyderabad and Madras States—that is, in the Malayalam and Telegu speaking areas of India.
Ceylon, May 1952, 2,334,306 votes polled; 95 elected seats and 6 appointed seats.	Communist Party of Ceylon: 134,528 votes (5.8 percent), 4 seats (4.2 percent). Lanka Sama Samaj Party (Trotskyite): 305,114 votes (13.0 percent), 9 seats (9.5 percent).	5,000 (estimate)	Like the Communist Parties of India and Pakistan, the Communist Party of Ceylon has been following a united-front political line for some time. The recent general election revealed that it has a significant popular following in the western and southern part of the island where the plantation labor, largely from South India, is concentrated. The popular following of the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj Party is also largely concentrated in this part of the island.

The Far East

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist	Anti-Communist	Other active parties		
National Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan).	Communist Party and pro-Communist parties are illegal.	The Kuomintang is the dominant party in the government. The 2 legal minor parties, the Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, each have a few seats in the Legislative Yuan and one nonministerial portfolio in the Executive Yuan.	Several disunited groups which are both anti-Communist and anti-Kuomintang, generally known as the Third Force, operate outside Communist China and Taiwan, centering activities in Hong Kong and Japan.	No basis for estimate	The Communist Party's underground efforts are directed from the mainland by the party's Central Committee in Peiping. The National Government's countersubversive program, accelerated in 1951, however, has greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Communist underground. The chief functions of the Communist network have been to assist any future invasion force and to conduct espionage activities rather than to incite and lead a revolt against the National Government. Propaganda activity is conducted from the mainland largely by the Taiwan League for Democratic Self-government. Communists have paid little attention to building up their strength among such vital groups as the armed forces, bureaucracy, peasantry, or urban workers, although from time to time, the National Government has announced the execution of Communists who have infiltrated into the army and government. The number of these announcements have decreased sharply since late 1952.
Communist China (numbers in parenthesis after the name of the party indicates its representation at September 1949 constituent assembly).	Communist Party dominates all political activity. 7 non-Communist parties inherited from period of National Government control (China Democratic League (16), Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (16), Democratic National Construction Association (12), China Peasants and Workers Democratic Party (10), China Association for Promoting Democracy (8), Chih Kung Tang (6), Chiusan Society (5)) are permitted to exist to maintain fiction of a "united front." These parties have been pres-	None	None	5,800,000 (this figure has been claimed since December 1950, and most recently on July 1, 1952. Actual total may now be higher.	The Chinese Communist Party is now engaged in a 3-year program, ending in 1954, of "ideological remolding" within its ranks, designed to assure it of a membership that clearly understands the party's program for "building socialism." The scope of this purge will be limited by the party leaders' insistence on patience and leniency during the remolding process. The result of the purge will probably be a somewhat more uniform and united membership, but the party will continue to have problems with rank and file corruption and inefficiency. Notwithstanding its dissatisfaction with the way its directives are executed in some localities and its concern over the readiness of party members to undertake the socialization of the economy, the Chinese Communist Party still exercises firm control over the governmental apparatus. The party has almost completed the setting up of the mass organizations and governmental institutions it desires for the indirect exercise of its power. The herding of the peasants in the direction of collective agricul-

	sured into expanding their membership and organization among certain strictly selected social groups in China and among overseas Chinese so as to extend the Communist Party's channels of indirect rule.				ture is now the principal task of social organization facing the party.
Outer Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party dominates all political activity.	None	None	28,000 plus (Communist claim, December 1947).	The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, under Soviet domination, is in control of all political, economic, and social activity.

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Communist-dominated	Conservative		
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea): 572 members elected in August 1948. Constitution stipulates 3-year term but no new elections have been held.	Korean Labor Party: 157 seats (28 percent).	Democratic Unification Front and member organizations: 415 seats (72 percent).	None	Korean Labor Party has over 1 million members according to a January 1953 broadcast from Communist China.	Communist organizations totally control the North Korean Government. Under Communist authority all mass organizations in North Korea are combined into a popular front to facilitate rigid minority control of all aspects of life. The Government pretends to represent all Korea, and is supported by Communists and Communist-dominated organizations claiming membership in south as well as north.
Republic of Korea (South Korea): Only 183 members are now seated in the national assembly as against 210 originally elected to 4-year terms in May 1950, 27 members having fallen into North Korean hands during the hostilities. Political alinements of the existing membership have been somewhat fluid. No elections have been held to establish an upper house in the legislature as provided for in a July 1952 constitutional amendment.	None	None	President Rhee is supported by the Liberal Party, comprising at present 103 members (56 percent). The Democratic Nationalist Party has 29 members (16 percent). The remainder of the assembly members are, at present, registered as independents.	Cannot be estimated under present conditions. Membership in the North Korea Labor Party and other Communist and Communist-front organizations has been illegal since October 1949. Most South Korean Communist leaders have been in North Korea since 1948.	Only small bands of Communist guerrillas remain active in several mountainous areas of South Korea. Pro-Communist sympathy among the general population apparently remains extremely low.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	Japanese Communist Party	Non-Communist Left parties	Conservative parties	Independents and minor parties	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Japan: Lower House (466 seats), Apr. 19, 1953.	1953—655,787 votes (1.9 percent), 1 seat. 1952—896,733 votes (2.5 percent), no seats.	Right Socialists: 1953—4,679,687 votes (13.5 percent), 66 seats. 1952—4,023,871 votes (11.4 percent), 57 seats. Left Socialists: 1953—4,506,469 votes (13 percent), 72 seats. 1952—3,493,973 votes (10 percent), 54 seats. Labor-Farmer: 1953—358,773 votes (1 percent), 5 seats. 1952—261,190 votes (0.7 percent), 4 seats.	Liberals: 1953—13,484,238 votes (39 percent), 199. 1952—16,428,235 votes (48 percent), 240. New Liberals (seceded from Liberals in March 1953): 1953—3,054,999 votes (8.8 percent), 35 seats. Progressives: 1953—6,186,288 votes (17.9 percent), 76 seats. 1952—6,421,060 votes (18.2 percent), 85 seats.	1953—1,675,810 votes (4.9 percent), 12 seats. 1952—2,922,580 votes (8.3 percent), 24 seats.	Approximately 80,000.	Since mid-1950, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has transferred much of its leadership, organization, and activity underground. However, it remains a legal party with one representative in each house of the National Diet. The decline in party strength, evident after 1949, has continued not only as a result of suppressive measures taken by the occupation and the Japanese Government, but also because of the adverse reaction occasioned by the party's resort to violence, particularly during the first half of 1952. Since mid-1950 the party has been engaged in building an effective underground structure, including paramilitary units, and after January 1952 increasingly engaged in subversion and acts of violence. Following public criticism of the party in July 1952 by Tokuda Kyuichi, secretary-general of the party who has been underground since 1950, increasing attention has been given to "legal," particularly propaganda and agitational activities, and to the coordination of overt and covert programs. The factionalism which previously had impaired the party's effectiveness has not, however, been an important factor in party affairs since the adoption of the "new program" in October 1951. The degree of control which the party exercises within the trade unions and farmers' organizations remains limited, although its efforts to exploit these movements continue. In line with Tokuda's criticism, the party campaigned vigorously during
Upper House (250 seats), Apr. 24, 1953. Triennial elections held for half the membership, divided into 75 seats in prefectural districts and 50 in nation at large. Seat totals include those elected in 1950 plus newly elected members. Vote totals apply only to prefectural districts in 1953 election.	1953—264,729 votes (0.9 percent), 1 seat.	Right Socialists: 1953—2,937,902 votes (10.5 percent), 26 seats. Left Socialists: 1953—3,917,826 votes (14 percent), 40 seats. Labor-Farmer: 1953—277,342 votes (1 percent), 2 seats.	Liberals: 1953—8,803,117 votes (31.4 percent), 93 seats. New Liberals: 1953—522,540 votes (1.9 percent), 2 seats. Progressive: 1953—2,840,341 votes (10.1 percent). Ryokufukai: 1953—2,096,103 votes (7.5 percent).	1953—6,350,966 votes (22.7 percent).		

						the October 1952 and April 1953 general elections. Party tactics during and after these campaigns were marked by an effort to stress common objectives with all other groups in opposition to the Yoshida government and by extension, to the United States and Japan's policy of close alinement with the United States. A considerable part of the party's loss in popular support evident in the April 1953 election returns appears to have been the result of JCP efforts to shift its vote to the support of non-Communist candidates acceptable to it. Although the JCP continues to maintain and even strengthen its paramilitary organization and its limited potential for violence it is expected that for the immediate future the party will place continued emphasis on its "legal" organization and activities, endeavoring to exploit popular discontent and to increase anti-American sentiment.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist Parties	Non-Communist Parties		
Burma, 1951	Burma Communist Party (BCP): The major Communist organization. Maintains international Communist contacts. Underground and without parliamentary representation.	The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL): The governing coalition. Including its dominant element, the Burma Socialist Party, the AFPFL controls about 80 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.	Burma Communist Party: 24,000 (1950 claim); under 10,000 (estimate).	The Burma Communist Party (BCP) has been in armed revolt against the Government since 1948. Within the past year, its guerrilla forces have been dislodged from some important areas they once controlled in central and eastern Burma.
	Communist Party (Burma): A small national Communist group which split from the BCP in 1946. Not represented in legislature.	People's Peace Front: A leftist group with perhaps 1 percent of the seats in Chamber of Deputies; members usually follow BWPP.	Communist Party (Burma): Membership small; perhaps in the hundreds.	Within the past year, the BCP has been seeking to create an effective coalition with smaller rebel groups organized by the Communist Party (Burma) and a faction of the People's Volunteer Organization.
	Burma Workers and Peasants Party: A Communist-led group which broke with the Burma Socialist Party in December 1950. Holds about 4 percent of seats in Chamber of Deputies.	Mahabama: Now represents little more than personal following of Dr. Ba Maw, with 1 seat in Chamber of Deputies.	China Democratic League: Principal Chinese Communist organization; membership unknown.	Chinese Communist strength is primarily in Rangoon and principal inland towns, with some influence among shopkeepers, Chinese labor unions, Chinese schools.
		Minor parties: Represent ethnic minorities.		
Thailand, 1952. Communists take no part in overt party politics. Membership in Communist organizations illegal since 1952.	Thai Communist Party: Thai Communist Party composed largely of intellectuals, relatively ineffective in comparison with Chinese Communist Party (Thailand).	The Thai Constitution allows for political parties, but necessary enabling legislation has not been passed. Thus, no formal political parties exist at present. The present National Assembly is composed of members of the 1947 coup group and their supporters, plus a few independent opposition members.	Thai Communist Party: Small; no accurate figures.	The Chinese Communist Party (Thailand) operates through Chinese labor unions, Chinese schools and newspapers, Chinese social and cultural associations, and some commercial enterprises. Chinese Communist activities center in Bangkok and in the Malaya border area. The Thai Communist Party offers a Thai front for the predominantly Chinese Communist movement as well as a channel for influencing dissatisfied non-Communist Thai. Indochinese Communists are active among the 50,000 Vietnamese refugees of northeast Thailand.
	Chinese Communist Party (Thailand): A potential threat to the Thai Government because of its influence among the 3 million Chinese in Thailand and its support from Communist China.		Chinese Communist Party (Thailand): Estimates vary up to 5,000.	
	Indochinese Communists in Thailand support the Democratic Republic of Vietnam military activities in Indochina.		Indochinese Communists: No estimate or claim.	

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Bloc supported by Communists	Non-Communist Parties		
Vietnam	Vietnam Workers Party: The Indochinese Communist Party, officially dissolved in November 1945, reemerged as the Vietnam Workers Party at a congress held in February 1951 in the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Communist organizations and activities are prohibited in areas under Franco-Vietnamese control.	The Workers Party is in full control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the National United Front (Lien Viet) which includes the numerous subsidiary front organizations within the regime.	Major non-Communist political groupings in Vietnam are the Catholics, the Caodaists, and the Dai Viet and Vietnam Nationalist Parties. Some of these groupings, notably the Catholics, survive in the Communist zones, although they have been largely driven underground. For the most part these groupings support the anti-Communist policies of the Government of Vietnam under Bao Dai.	No reliable estimates of party membership; Communist sources claim a membership of 715,000.	The Workers Party completely controls the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which includes 54 percent of the total population of Vietnam, or some 13 million people. Within the DRV, Communists occupy 5 cabinet posts: the Presidency, Vice Presidency, and Ministries of National Defense, Labor, and Finance. Communist cadres have been installed throughout the armed forces and the administration.
Laos: National Assembly, Aug. 26, 1951; 39 seats.	The Laotian Resistance Government and the Laotian National United Front organized in August 1950 operate in close conjunction with Communist-dominated groups in Vietnam. There is no overt Communist activity in areas under control of French Union forces and the Laotian National Army.	The Laotian resistance movement, headed by Prince Souphanouvong.	The Laos Union National Party, Progressive Party, and Democratic Party and a number of independents make up the representation of the Laos National Assembly.	Believed negligible	Although the bulk of the Communist Viet Minh troops, which invaded one-third of the territory of Laos in the spring of 1953, have been withdrawn, political cadres have been installed to consolidate the political position of the Viet Minh and the Laotian resistance government. It is expected that activity of the Communists in Laos will increase in the coming months.
Cambodia: National Assembly elected Sept. 9, 1951, was dissolved by the King in January 1953 and an appointed National Consultative Council of 74 members installed on Mar. 2, 1953.	The Cambodian National United Front and Western Cambodia Mouta Seiha Party operate in close conjunction with Communist-dominated groups in Vietnam. There is no overt Communist activity in areas under control of French Union forces and Royal Cambodian forces.	The Cambodian resistance movement.	The Khmer Renovation, Democratic, National Recovery, Liberal, People's, Democratic-Progressive, National Union, and Victorious Northeastern Khmer Parties, as well as a number of independents are all opposed to communism.	do	As a result of the recent Viet Minh invasion of Laos, it is anticipated that Viet Minh Communist activity in conjunction with Cambodian resistance groups will increase.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Bloc supported by Communists	Non-Communist Parties		
Malaya	The Federation of Malaya does not have a national electoral system. In the Colony of Singapore some members of the Legislative Council are elected but the Malayan Communist Party has put up no candidates. In June and July 1948 the Malayan Communist Party and its satellite labor, veterans, and youth organizations were banned in the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore.			3,000–5,000, more than 90 percent of whom are Chinese (estimate).	The party directs the approximately 4,000 strong Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), which has been waging guerrilla warfare against British security forces, civilians, and the economy of Malaya since mid-1948. The party and army are supported by undercover Min Yuen organizations, whose membership is unknown but may well exceed 15,000. Most Min Yuen members are not party members, but they supply the Communist guerrillas with funds, information, supplies, shelter, and recruits. Since mid-1948 police and military measures have been taken against the Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan Races Liberation Army, and subsidiary Communist-controlled supporting organizations by forces consisting of 40,000 regular troops, 60,000 police, and nearly 200,000 part-time home guards. The difficulty in carrying on operations in the jungle and in exercising administrative control in parts of the country has been an obstacle to the suppression of the Communist terrorism. However, the successful resettlement of a half million Chinese squatters into protected areas (Chinese form nearly half the total population) and the successful execution of other antiguerrilla measures appear to have led to improvement in security in most areas of Malaya over the past year.

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist parties		
Indonesia	Pending the holding of general elections, party representation in the unicameral Parliament continues to be determined by Government fiat. Indonesian Communist Party (Stalinist) has 16 votes (6.8 percent), plus 14 votes (5.5 percent) from satellite and allied groups, and about 8 votes (5 percent) from nonparty members, giving a theoretical maximum of 38 votes (17.8 percent). Proletarian Party Murba (National Communist) has 4 votes (1.9 percent).	Nonreligious parties: 1. Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 37 votes, 17.3 percent. 2. Great Indonesia Association (PIR), 15 votes, 7 percent. 3. Indonesian Socialist Party, 14 votes, 6.5 percent. 4. Democratic Faction, 13 votes, 6.1 percent. 5. National People's Party (PRN), 8 votes, 3.8 percent. 6. Labor Party, 5 votes, 2.3 percent. 7. Party of Great Indonesia (Parindra), 4 votes, 1.9 percent. 8. Indonesian People's League (SKI), 3 votes, 1.4 percent. Religious parties: Moslem League (Masjumi), 39 votes, 18.2 percent. Nahdatul Ulama, 8 votes, 3.7 percent. Catholic Party, 8 votes, 3.7 percent. Protestant Party (Parkindo), 6 votes, 2.8 percent. United Indonesian Islamic Party (PSII), 4 votes, 1.9 percent. To this may be added about 8 votes (3.7 percent) from nonparty members, giving a theoretical total of 172 non-Communist votes in Parliament (80.4 percent).	Indonesian Communist Party, 30,000 (claim, 1951).	The Indonesian Communist Party, severely weakened and almost totally disorganized for a year following the setback it received in the abortive "Madiun rebellion" in the fall of 1948, reappeared openly in Indonesian political life after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949. It has been able to continue to capitalize on unresolved "nationalist" issues and to foment and exploit social and economic discontent. It has retained its hold over the Indonesian Central Labor Organization (the principal trade-union federation) and appears to have gained somewhat among the farmers and local village youth groups. Its activities were temporarily hampered in mid-1951 by growing governmental realization of the danger of Communist subversion which led to the arrests of top Communist leaders in the security sweeps of August 1951. Most of the Communist leaders have since been released. Currently the Indonesian Communist Party is relying on united-front tactics and nominal support for the present Cabinet to enhance its appeal. The Proletarian Party, based on the doctrine of the "national Communist" hero Tan Malaka, has a stand on internal and international issues in general indistinguishable from that of the Stalinists.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist parties		
The Philippines.	Communist Party (PKP): In May 1951 the PKP was declared illegal by a Philippine court decision.	With 1 exception (an anti-Communist independent), all Philippine congressmen are members of the anti-Communist Liberal and Nacionalista Parties. The Liberal Party controls 59 of the seats in the House and 11 of the seats in the Senate. Nacionalista Party controls 34 seats in the House and 12 seats in the Senate.	PKP strength probably numbers 3,000 to 5,000. Estimates of the membership of the Communist-led Huks and of Chinese Communists in the Philippines have varied widely, and it is difficult to give reliable membership figures. Insofar as such figures can be determined, Huk strength is probably about 8,000 to 10,000; and the number of Chinese Communists in the Philippines is probably about 1,000 to 2,000.	Since late 1950, Government raids upon PKP members and vigorous Government efforts to eradicate the Communist element from the labor movement have reduced Communist influence almost exclusively to leadership of the armed Huk movement. By 1953, moreover, the Huk movement in the Visayas apparently had been suppressed; the Huk strength in central and southern Luzon, the long-standing stronghold, has been reduced. PKP influence probably still exists in some labor unions, tenant-farmer groups, and women's and youth's leagues, but apparently such organizations have been identified by the Government and driven underground.

European possessions in the Caribbean

Country	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
French overseas departments in Western Hemisphere (Martinique Guadeloupe, French Guiana).	The Communist Party is the largest political party in Martinique, and 2 of Martinique's 3 deputies in the French National Assembly, elected in June 1951, are members of the party. In Guadeloupe the Communists are less strong, but they nevertheless send 1 of the department's 3 representatives to the National Assembly in Paris. French Guiana, on the other hand, has a weak Communist Party with little political influence.	No basis for estimate..	The Communists' predominance in Martinique is traceable to their strong opposition to racial discrimination and their control of most of the local trade unions. Nevertheless, Communists no longer have the overwhelming majority in nearly every commune which they enjoyed at the end of the war. Although less successful in Guadeloupe, the Communists maintain an active organization in both the political and labor fields.
British dependent territories (West Indies, Guiana, and Honduras).	Communists and fellow travelers dominate 2 popular-front parties, the extremely weak West Indian Independence Party in Trinidad and the powerful Peoples' Progressive Party in British Guiana. The latter in April 1953 won 18 of 24 elective seats in the House of Assembly and control of a majority in the executive council.	Small; no estimate....	Although no legal Communist Party has been established in any of these areas, Communists are active in the West Indian Independence Party of Trinidad and in the Peoples' Progressive Party of British Guiana. The latter now controls much of the governmental machinery. A few Communists and Communist sympathizers are active in labor unions in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, and some of the small islands.
Netherlands possessions (West Indies, and Guiana (Surinam)).	No Communist parties exist in these territories.....	....do.....	No legal Communist Party exists here.

Latin America

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist parties	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition parties		
Argentina, November 1951	Communist Party (PCA): No seats.	Peronista Party: 175 seats (93 percent).	Radical Party: 14 seats (7 percent). Progressive Democratic Party: No seats. Socialist Party: No seats.	Under 40,000 (estimate), 30,000 (claim, 1947).	The orthodox Communist Party, though legal, is under close police surveillance. It favors or opposes government policies in measure as those policies further Communist objectives. A group of so-called dissident Communists have consistently supported the government; they are believed loyal to Moscow although at odds with the orthodox Argentine Communist Party. Communists and sympathizers have infiltrated organized labor and the press in Argentina and therefore could probably cause serious trouble in event of political crisis.
Bolivia, May 1951	Communist Party (PCB) (illegal). Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) (Trotskyite). Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) (reportedly dissolved in mid-1952.)	National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (military junta which took power in May 1951 was ousted by MNR coup in April 1952).	Socialist Falange (FSB), Social Democratic Party (PSD), Republican Socialist Union Party (PUSR), Liberal Party.	Under 2,000 (estimate for PCB).	International communism gained a foothold in the 1940's through the Marxist Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) and the Trotskyist Revolutionary Worker's Party (POR), which has its strength among the mineworkers. The Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) appeared in early 1950 with the separation of a sector of PIR, chiefly youth-student elements, to form an openly Stalinist group. Communist strategy in Bolivia appears to be directed toward obtaining the collaboration of certain ultranationalist and leftist elements associated with the MNR administration party.
Brazil, October 1950	Communist Party (PCB) (illegal) 1 deputy elected on non-Communist ticket.	Social Democratic Party (PDB): 2,068,405 votes (35 percent), 141 seats (38 percent). Brazilian Worker's Party (PTB): 1,262,000 votes (20.7 percent), 63 seats (17 percent). Social Progressive Party (PSP): 558,792 votes (9.2 percent), 31 seats (8 percent).	National Democratic Union (UDN): 1,301,459 votes (21.3 percent), 90 seats (25 percent). Republican Party (PR): 216,207 votes (3.5 percent), 15 seats (4 percent). Socialist Party (PSB): 36,638 votes (0.6 percent), 2 seats (0.6 percent).	Under 60,000 (estimate), 130,000 (claim, 1947).	During the period of its legal existence (1945–47) the Communist Party gained an advantageous position in organized labor, considerable political power in the major industrial areas, and a fairly large following among farm labor, women's and youth groups, and intellectual circles. Early in 1948 the legislative mandates of Communists were canceled, and party leaders became fugitives. In illegality the party lost a number of marginal supporters and lost ground in organized labor and important national organizations representing university students and war veterans. Recent efforts of the party have been directed toward infiltration of government and other key organizations in order to prevent participation of foreign capital in the development of Brazilian resources and Brazilian cooperation with the West. Communists have been able to maintain a moderate infiltration of government agencies. They have had some success also, especially on local levels, in electing Communists to governmental office as candidates of legal

					parties. The party has also been able greatly to increase its propaganda audience and strengthen its influence among non-Communist groups by front organizations which exploit nationalism and isolationism.
Chile, March 1953	Communist Party (PCCH) (illegal): People's Front, 10 seats (5 percent).	Agrarian Labor (PAL), Popular Socialist (PSP), People's Democratic, National Christian, Doctrinary Radical, etc.: 86 seats (45 percent).	Liberal Party: 33 seats (17 percent). Radical: 29 seats (15 percent). Traditional Conservative: 22 seats (11 percent). Social Christian Conservative, Falange, Agrarian: 8 seats (4 percent).	Under 40,000 (estimate), 50,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communist Party was virtually outlawed by the Defense of Democracy Law of September 1948, when 28,000 Communists were disenfranchised. The law did not cover Communist youth and women, and some Communist Party members are believed to have infiltrated other parties. Communists have maintained important influence in unions despite the ban on Communist labor activity and have been a force among university students and intellectuals. In the September 1952 presidential elections the Communists joined with a Socialist segment in a "People's Front" which polled about 5 percent of the total vote. In recent months the Communists have been very active through their political, labor, and other fronts in propagandizing for extremist solutions of national problems.
Colombia, March 1953	Communist Party (PCC): did not participate in elections.	Conservative Party: 106 seats (54 percent), 78 seats vacant.	Liberal Party (did not participate in elections). Dissident Conservative Factions (did not participate in elections): 13 seats (7 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate), 10,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communists have been weakened by internal dissensions. They lost an important source of strength in 1950 with the split between Liberal and Communist wings of the proliberal labor federation (CTC). Communists still maintain some influence within the labor movement despite the predominance of the non-Communist labor organizations. The poor Communist showing in September 1952 congressional elections suggested that Communist labor support had been greatly undermined. In April 1952, on the 4th anniversary of the Bogota riots, Radio Moscow extolled the Colombian guerrillas, who have been in arms against the Conservative Government since 1949, as a "national liberation army." Shortly thereafter, the Communist Party announced that it could not "remain indifferent" to the guerrilla struggle.
Costa Rica, October 1949	Popular Vanguard (VP) (illegal). Progressive Independent Party (PPI).	National Union Party: 54,375 votes (72 percent), 33 seats (73 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 5,034 votes (7 percent), 3 seats (7 percent). Constitutional Party, etc.: 16,422 votes (22 percent), 9 seats (20 percent). National Liberation Party. National Republican Party.	Under 5,000 (estimate), 20,000 (claim, 1947).	The Vanguard Popular (Communist) Party was a leading faction within the government prior to the April 1948 revolution which installed an anti-Communist governing junta. The latter outlawed the Vanguardia Popular in July 1948, and exiled some of its leaders. The 1949 constitution sanctioned anti-Communist action and subsequently Communist activities have been kept under surveillance. Nevertheless, certain Communist leaders have returned to resume operations in Costa Rica; a political front, the Progressive Independent Party, is attempting to take part in national elections scheduled for July 1953; and, in early 1953, the Communists were able to organize a labor confederation to take the place of one previously dissolved by the government.

Latin America—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist parties	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition parties		
Cuba, June 1950	Popular Socialist Party (PSP).	Progressive Action Party (PAP) (Congress was suspended in March 1952).	Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autentico). Party of the Cuban People (Ortodoxo). Democrata Liberal Parties, etc.	Under 30,000 (estimate), 30,000 (claim, 1950).	The Cuban Communist Party dominated the Cuban labor movement for about a decade beginning in the late 1930's. Communism encountered a check in 1947 when the Autentico administration undertook to break Communist control of organized labor and pursued an active anti-Communist policy with the support of non-Communist labor leaders. The party's influence remains strongest in youth and women's organizations, and in sugar, tobacco, and maritime unions. The loss of predominant influence in the labor movement meant a serious loss of revenue, and setbacks created dissension in the party though the old guard remained in firm control. The party has tried to purge its ranks of lukewarm elements and to tighten party discipline.
Dominican Republic, May 1952.	Popular Socialist Party (PSPD) (illegal, based in Guatemala).	Dominican Party, etc.: 1,038,646 votes (100 percent), all seats.	Dominican Revolutionary Party (in exile).	Negligible (estimate), 2,000 (claim, 1947).	Except for brief periods, the Communists have been forced completely underground by the Trujillo regime. They appear to have no party organization and only negligible strength within the country.
Ecuador, June 1952	Communist Party (PCE): 1 seat (0.9 percent). Socialist Party (PSE): 4 seats (3.7 percent).	Velasquista organization: 34 seats (31.2 percent).	Conservative Party: 30 seats (27.5 percent). Catholics: 15 seats (13.8 percent). Liberal Party: 22 seats (20.1 percent). Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP): 2 seats (1.8 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate), 2,500 (claim, 1947).	Communists find their chief source of support in intellectual and student circles and in the labor movement. Communist labor leaders share control of a large sector of organized labor with the Socialist Party. The latter, far larger and stronger than the Communist Party, has recently taken a more decided stand in favor of cooperation with the Communists. Communists are also able to wield real influence among schoolteachers and certain youth and student groups in the larger cities and in the coastal region. The Velasco Ibarra government, soon after its inauguration in September 1952, began to take steps to reduce Communist influence in the educational system and elsewhere.
El Salvador, May 1952	Communist Party (PCS) (illegal).	Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD): 700,979 votes (99.9 percent), all seats.		Under 1,000 (estimate).	Communist activity is outlawed in El Salvador, but the party is active clandestinely in labor and student groups. The Osorio administration took steps during 1951 to repress the Communist labor entity, which had gained virtually uncontested leadership over organized labor. In September 1952 the administration announced the existence of a Communist plot against the Government, made sweeping arrests and exiled various Communist leaders.

Guatemala, January 1953	Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT): 4 seats (7 percent). Dropped name of Communist Party and registered as legal party in December 1952. Constitution prohibits "formation of * * * political organizations of international or foreign character." In 1953 elections Communists won 1 of 32 seats at issue, leaving their number in Congress 4, same as before. The other 3 were elected in 1950 on administration party slates. Other parties of ruling coalition include pro-Communist elements.	Revolutionary Action Party (PAR): 21 seats (37.5 percent). Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG): 16 seats (28.6 percent). National Renovation (RN): 7 seats (12.5 percent). Ruling coalition includes Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist).	National Electoral Union, Patriotic Union, etc.: 5 seats (8.9 percent).	do	Communists in Guatemala, who may number no more than 500, and Communist sympathizers have succeeded in gaining control of labor and have attained influential positions in the administration parties and in the Government. Communists occupy 4 of the 56 seats in Congress. 3 of these ran as candidates of the administration parties in the December 1950 congressional elections. 1 was elected in January 1953 when the PGT was formally associated with the proadministration parties in the National Electoral Front. Communist labor leaders succeeded in organizing a united national labor federation in October 1951 which has increased Communist leverage in the political sphere. Communist leaders were instrumental in passage of an agrarian reform law in June 1952. By supporting the Government in implementing provisions of the law and by successfully infiltrating into the administrative machinery of the National Agrarian Department, they have extended their influence into rural areas. Little improvement can be looked for so long as the administration refuses to take seriously the international character of the Communist movement and the danger involved in continued toleration of and collaboration with the Communists.
Haiti, October 1950	Communist Party (illegal). Popular Socialist Party (PSP) (illegal).	Magloire Group	Workers and Peasants Party.	Negligible (estimate), 500 (claim, 1947).	The Communist movement in Haiti is very small. Communist influence in the labor movement, which Communists helped to organize, has greatly diminished. The Communist Party was outlawed in April 1947; the Communist-line Popular Socialist Party was outlawed in December 1950.
Honduras, October 1948	No Communist Party (illegal). Democratic Revolutionary Party (PDRH) (illegal).	Nationalist Party: 255,974 votes (99.9 percent), all seats.	Liberal Party, etc.: 514 votes.	Negligible (estimate).	There is no active Communist Party as such in Honduras. The number of pro-Communists is small and is centered on the north coast. What Communist activity there is seems to stem from Guatemala and to be aimed at the workers employed by the United States-owned corporations along the coast.
Mexico, July 1952	Communist Party (PCM) (lacks membership required for electoral registration). Popular Party (PP) 2 seats (0.9 percent).	Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI): 204 seats (90 percent).	National Action Party (PAN): 5 seats (2.3 percent). Nationalist Party (PNM) 2 seats (0.9 percent). Federation of People's Parties (FPPM): 1 seat (0.5 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate), 25,000 (claim, 1947).	Over a long period of time, Communists and pro-Communists had infiltrated into leading positions in Government and labor organizations. This trend was reversed under the Aleman administration, while dissensions within the Communist movement and loss of strength in the Government-influenced labor organizations further impaired the position of the Communists. The Communist-line Popular Party, formed in 1947 by Lombardo Toledano, head of the CTAL, retains the backing of segments of the oil, mining, and metallurgical unions. Lombardo's party is also the major moving force behind Communist propaganda fronts.

Latin America—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist parties	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition parties		
Nicaragua, May 1950	Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN) (illegal).	National Liberal Party: 153,297 votes (75 percent), 40 seats (67 percent).	Conservative Party: 49,401 votes (25 percent), 20 seats (33 percent).	Under 500 (estimate), 500 (claim, 1947).	The Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Communist) has long been banned and a number of key leaders are in exile in Guatemala. The Communists' once dominant position in the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) has been demolished. Although weakened and split, Communists still work in most trade unions as actively as their handicap permits.
Panama, May 1952	People's Party (PDP) (lacks membership required for national electoral registration).	National Patriotic Coalition (CPN): 44 seats (83 percent).	National Liberal Party, etc.: 9 seats (17 percent).	Under 1,000 (estimate), 500 (claim, 1947).	The People's Party (Communist) finds its main support among youth-student and labor groups. Communist and pro-Communists have also infiltrated ultra-nationalist political groups and the school system. The Communists were able in 1951 to organize a popular, although short-lived demonstration in alliance with widely representative non-Communist elements and also were among the leaders of anti-Remon student strikes in 1951–52. The Government has recently taken steps against Communist infiltration in the educational system.
Paraguay, July 1950	Communist Party (PCP) (illegal).	Colorado Party: 218,172 votes (100 percent), all seats.	Liberal, Febrerista Parties (did not participate in elections).	Under 2,000 (estimate), 8,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communists have their main source of support abroad. The Colorado administration has pursued a policy of suppressing Communist activity and the Communists have failed to show strength among labor groups, their major target.
Peru, July 1950	do	Pro-Odria Group: 194 seats (95.6 percent).	Anti-Odria Independents: 5 seats (2.4 percent). Socialist Party: 4 seats (2 percent). Aprista Party (illegal).	Under 10,000 (estimate), 35,000 (claim, 1947).	The party has remained divided between the "orthodox" faction outlawed in October 1948 and dissident groups. The latter have remained more or less unmolested but have not been effective in expanding their organization or influence. Communists of one or the other groups have maintained a measure of influence among transportation, mining, and dockworkers.
Uruguay, November 1950.	Communist Party (PCU): 19,026 votes (2.3 percent), 2 seats (1.5 percent).	Colorado Party: 433,164 votes (52.3 percent), 71 seats (54.3 percent).	Herrerista, Independent Nationalist, Civic Union: 358,349 votes (43.3 percent), 55 seats (42.7 percent). Socialist Party: 17,041 votes (2.1 percent), 2 seats (1.5 percent).	15,000 (estimate), 15,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communist Party finds its main source of support among organized labor, local Slavic groups, and in intellectual circles. The Communist-dominated labor federation (UGT) reached the peak of its influence in the early postwar period and since 1948 has lost much of its former control over labor. In mid-1951, as the result of dissensions within the party and labor's resentment of Communist use of its labor following for purely Communist purposes, large scale defections from the UGT occurred. The

					party's representation in Congress declined from 6 to 2 members in 1950 elections indicating the extent to which it has lost a following. Despite these losses, the Communists still maintain a foothold in strategic sectors of the economy through their union affiliates, and are making determined efforts to extend the audience for their propaganda.
Venezuela, April 1953....	Communist Party (PCV) (illegal). Revolutionary Proletarian Party (PRP-c): (dissident, reportedly dissolved in 1952).	Independent Electoral Front (FEI) and other pro-Government groups received a large majority in both houses of the national congress designated by the Constituent Assembly in April 1953.	Copei Democratic Republican Union (URD). Venezuelan Socialist Party (PSV). Democratic Action (AD) (illegal).	Under 20,000 (estimate), 27,000 (claim, 1950).	The Venezuelan Government outlawed the principal Communist Party (PCV) in May 1950 and dissolved its petroleum federation and affiliates which had taken a leading part in an oilfields strike. PCV was thereby deprived of its major source of labor support. Since that time many PCV leaders have been arrested or exiled, or have gone into hiding. The smaller dissident Communist Party (PRP-c), which was not affected by the Government's action against the PCV, and which had some following among oil workers as well as union affiliates in the Caracas area, reportedly dissolved itself in mid-1952. Leaders of the former PRP-c have continued active in the labor field.

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REGIONAL SUMMARY

A. Communism in Western Europe

I. STRENGTH

In the 16 countries of Western Europe the Communist parties have an estimated membership of approximately 3 million, and in national elections they poll about 13 million votes. Communist membership and electoral strength are not, however, evenly distributed throughout the area. Quite the contrary, the great bulk of Communist members and voters is found in Italy and France. These 2 countries together account for two-thirds of Western Europe's Communist members and 10½ of the 13 million Communist votes. Elsewhere Communist membership ranges from a few hundred, as in Ireland and Luxembourg, up to the 130,000 mark in West Germany. Aside from Italy and France, moreover, the Communist vote is quite small and usually amounts to about 5 percent of the total vote. The only exception is Iceland, where the Communist vote runs to 20 percent of the total vote—a figure not far under the 25–30 percent which the Communists poll in France and Italy.

In addition to their considerable membership and their sizable electoral support, the Communists of Western Europe have notable trade union strength. In Italy, particularly, but also in France, the largest national trade union federations are controlled by Communists. Elsewhere, with one minor exception in the Netherlands, the Communists do not dominate national union organizations. They do, however, frequently control locals, some of which are fairly large and located in industries important to the national economy.

Despite the size of their membership, their electoral strength, and their trade union support, the Communists have been excluded since the onset of the cold war from all those governments of Western Europe in which they were once present. Although Communists sit in the parliaments of 10 of the 16 Western European countries, they are isolated by the other parties to such an extent that they are prevented from directly participating in the formulation or administration of official policy.

In spite of the strength which the Communists still have they have lost heavily in membership and trade-union support during the past several years. Prior to 1947 the Communists were at peak strength, having recruited more members and won more followers during and immediately after the war than at any other time in their history. They were present in the governments of several countries, and, with few exceptions, had working relations with the non-Communist parties. During the past 5 years or so this whole picture has greatly changed. In addition to their decline in numbers the Communists have found themselves face to face with non-Communist parties which have be-

come increasingly anti-Communist and determined to curb the Communists. At no time in the past several years have the Communists been able to carry off successfully mass demonstrations or political strikes. In terms of electoral strength, however, the parties of Italy, France, and Iceland have succeeded in maintaining their postwar position virtually unchanged.

II. OBJECTIVES

The major short-range goal of the Communists in Western Europe is the detachment of their countries from the western alliance as the first step in the establishment of a situation in Western Europe which would be favorable to the Soviet Union. Short of this main immediate objective the Communists attempt to interfere with specific prowestern official policies such as rearmament within NATO and participation in the Korean and Indochinese wars. Always closely related to these efforts are the Communists' general attempts to weaken the present Western European governments and the whole economic and social fabrics of their countries. Finally, the Communists seek to create a psychological atmosphere which will undermine the confidence of Western Europe in its capacity for self-defense, disrupt the harmony of the Western European nations, and increase friction between them and the United States.

III. TACTICS

At the present time the Communists' prevailing tactic in Western Europe is that of the United National Front. In contrast with the Popular Front tactics of the 1930's, the present United National Front is not at this time an effort by the Communists to form alliances with entire non-Communist political parties and their leaders. It is, rather, an attempt to build up large popular movements by appealing to individuals from as many social, religious, and political groups as possible.

Dissatisfaction with prowestern foreign policies rather than a call for class struggle is the fundamental basis of current Communist appeals in Western Europe. Accordingly, the Communists say very little about political and economic issues which clearly separate them from non-Communists, and they avoid open advocacy of the use of force against their governments. Instead they set themselves up as the true nationalists of their countries, contending that their governments have sacrificed national interests and sold out to the United States while the Communists defend traditional national interests. In the same way the Communists claim that they alone protect democratic liberties and that they, therefore, should receive the cooperation of all those who want to safeguard these freedoms. Finally, the Communists continually strive to make themselves the mouthpiece of all those who are discontented, for a variety of reasons, with their governments and various aspects of the existing social and economic order.

The target groups of the Communists' United National Front tactics are very broad. The Communists have specifically said that they hope to attract bourgeois groups such as shopkeepers, businessmen, and professional people on the basis of their national appeals. In practice, however, the sectors on which the Communists concentrate are

more limited and include especially those groups which are dissatisfied with their social and economic status and their material living standards under conditions presently prevailing in their countries. Chief among these groups are urban workers, both white collar and manual, agricultural workers and some landholding farmers, and certain writers and artists who feel that the present social order is bankrupt.

In their efforts to exploit dissatisfaction with official policies and protest sentiment generally the Communists are not restricted to any single set of appeals. Instead they produce a variety of special appeals to various social and economic groups. Among industrial workers, for example, they invariably champion higher wages, while among agricultural groups they call for higher crop prices which would, in turn, reduce the industrial workers' purchasing power. They also tailor their propaganda to fit special localities and emphasize different propaganda points from area to area of a particular country.

In conducting this type of pinpointed propaganda the Communists have at their disposal a very extensive propaganda organization. Numerous newspapers, books, and magazines designed for many types of readers are published in nearly every country. In some countries Communist posters are a significant form of propaganda, as are signature campaigns and radio broadcasts beamed from the Soviet Union or the satellite bloc. Also among the methods which the Communists use in broadening their contacts are the front organizations. Such organizations are still of considerable, albeit declining importance, in Italy and France, while organizations of lesser size exist in West Germany and the United Kingdom, and only small ones remain in Scandinavia and Benelux. Finally, Communist-dominated trade unions, particularly in France, Italy, and Iceland are major vehicles for spreading Communist influence.

B. Communism in the Middle East and North Africa

I. OBJECTIVES

In a period of indigenous unrest that provides significant opportunities for Communism, the Communist parties of the Middle East, except potentially in Iran, still lack the strength to alter the structure of society by revolutionary action. Taking account both of their present weakness and their most promising opportunities, the Communists of the area have in recent years placed primary emphasis on discrediting the Western Powers, including the United States, rather than on destroying the internal bulwarks of reaction within each country. Everywhere, even in Iran, Communists have therefore two major immediate objectives: (1) To build a reliable and sizable cadre of trained Communists, and (2) to establish the broadest possible popular front with local nationalist groups opposed to political ties with the West. The latter aim receives the greatest emphasis in propaganda and organizational work, since a united front appears to be the best shortcut to success and also because the Communist cadre might be selected from among the most promising new allies.

A. Iran

In Iran, where the Soviet Union continues to press for the fulfillment of its two priority objectives—to separate Iran from the West and to

deprive the West of Iranian oil—the following factors are likely to shape events and determine whether the Communist Tudeh Party gains power: (1) The potentially revolutionary situation in Iran; (2) the increasing disintegration of the traditional social, political, and ideological framework; (3) Tudeh's own revolutionary impetus; and (4) the absence of any other major opposition to the Communist Party should the National Front or its major components disintegrate.

B. The Arab States and Israel

Should Iran turn Communist, the impact in the Arab world—given the basic weakness of many ruling groups and the discontent among the younger, more educated urban population—may improve the climate for Communist activities and cause Communists to become more aggressive.

For the time being, however, Communist objectives in the Arab world and Israel include, specifically, efforts to (1) bring about the dissolution of all formal local ties with the West; (2) render suspect all United States aid programs to the area; (3) deepen sentiment against any western-sponsored regional defense scheme; (4) encourage the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises; (5) increase trade with the Soviet bloc; and ultimately (6) create, in the process of national liberation from western control, a more democratic and socialist state under Communist control.

II. TACTICS

Communist objectives are intrinsically related to Communist tactical requirements: Most of the specific aims are intended to appeal to the broadest possible segments of prevailing public opinion, to lead such opinion into Communist-controlled channels, and finally to pervert local nationalist and reformist drives to Soviet purposes.

In practice, however, the Communist parties of the Middle East and North Africa have been compelled by their own organizational and financial weakness to confine themselves to far more limited tactical maneuvers. They have exacerbated riots or helped to turn political demonstrations to violence, and thus increased tension with a limited expenditure of direct effort. They have used the Partisans of Peace, the only Communist front which has achieved any significant size in the area, and to some degree have infiltrated non-Communist organizations and newspapers to encourage further local hostility against military or political connections with the West. Their local opponents have, in general, tended to ascribe to them far greater powers of initiative, penetration, organization, and tactical prowess than the Communists presently possess. This tendency of some local governments to magnify Communist strength in the Arab world is often impelled by (1) a general feeling of insecurity; (2) a lack of precise information on this subject; (3) an uncertainty as to the nature of communism; (4) a maneuvering to shift the blame for violence on others; (5) a political strategy to define a large internal menace compelling national unity; and (6) a hope to tar the opposition with the Communist label.

There was no evidence that the Soviet emphasis on anti-Zionism in the winter of 1952–53 had been deliberately designed or was being used for Communist exploitation in the Arab world. Some Arab nationalists have found it useful to play up the difference in Soviet

and western attitudes on Zionism and the continued menace of Israel in pursuit of their own objectives. In Israel, the reinforced Soviet campaign against Zionism has seriously weakened Communist control over the extreme left wing of the country.

III. OPERATIONS

At present, the Communist Parties in the Middle East are small, reaching potentially dangerous proportions only in Iran. The parties in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel are probably next in size although they are considerably behind Iran in numbers. Factionalism and personal rivalries are endemic. The main support of the Communist Parties derives, not from the peasants and workers but from a smaller segment of middle eastern society—the new urban groups which are the source of present unrest and the potential source of power. Thus far, however, the Communists have converted only a small portion of this segment, many of them, moreover, members of religious and ethnic minorities. The bulk of the new urban groups—discontented, but unable entirely to renounce traditional symbols and aspirations—is pulled instead toward various local interpretations of national socialism.

Individual Communists have, in certain instances, been able to infiltrate official government and army positions. Communists also may have entered into tactical alliances against their common domestic and foreign foes with certain rightists and antiwestern fronts. Although present Soviet requirements permit the Communists to exploit the most popular theme, namely anti-imperialism, among the people of the area, they have been unable to capture the initiative in this campaign. Many nationalists are aware that this strategy is obviously based on immediate Soviet, rather than local, needs and distrust it. It has made the Communist Party almost indistinguishable from other local groups and the majority of those who feel strongly on imperialism have joined, instead, those parties which form the core of the nationalist movement. Communist tacticians have been forced to give second place to issues involving social discontent, but hence have left these to be exploited more directly by other extremist groups.

Present Communist weaknesses are not decisive facts in considering Communist prospects in the Middle East and North Africa. Science and industrialization have introduced into the era new methods in technology, production, administration, and distribution. Arabs and Iranians are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits to be derived from a new way of life. Whether communism can take advantage of opportunities inherent in this situation depends in no small measure on the skill and capacities of those who lead the forces arraigned against it. Unless those forces are effective, communism could increasingly pervert to its own ends the Middle East's pressing interest in progress and status.

C. Communism in Africa South of the Sahara

Although there are individual Communists in Africa south of the Sahara, there are no organized Communist movements with the exception of an inconsequential party in French Equatorial Africa.

There are Communist elements in British West African nationalist and labor groups, but they exert little influence. Communist influence in British East and Central Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Portuguese African territories is insignificant.

Short-run Communist aims in this area are (1) to undermine western prestige; (2) to project an image of Soviet and Communist support of nationalist movements; and (3) to weaken and subvert established authority. The first and second aims have had very limited success; the third is, at present, beyond Communist strength.

Propaganda is centered on such native grievances as alleged or actual land expropriation, exploitation by European economic enterprise, and political, social, and economic discrimination. It has met with only limited success among its chief targets, which compromise disaffected nonwhites, particularly young intellectuals, nationalist activists, and organized labor. Efforts to attract the peasantry have been thwarted by preoccupation with family and tribal affairs, and natural barriers to communication.

Attempts to infiltrate nationalist and other dissident groups have not been very successful to date, although a few nationalist leaders have been exposed to Communist influence, which may be reflected in their tactics. Such influence is incidental, however, in current manifestations of anticolonial feeling, which are rooted in far more fundamental social and economic changes.

Communist capabilities, although limited at present, are likely to be enhanced increasingly by (1) racial tensions; (2) the rising political consciousness of the Africans; and (3) the dislocations and uncertainties arising from the breakdown of the traditional societies and the emergence of new economic, social, and political forms. Communist exploitation of these factors will largely depend on the ability of the colonial administrations to adjust to the changes which are taking place.

D. Communism in Latin America

I. STRENGTH

During the period 1944–47 the Stalinist Communist parties in Latin America had some 330,000 members and polled an aggregate of about 1 million votes in various national elections. Since then party membership has fallen to about 200,000. In 12 of the 20 countries, the Communist Party is now officially suppressed. In none is it an important electoral factor. The Communists, as such, have no present prospect of gaining control over any Latin American government by electoral means. Their direct participation in national politics is significant only in Guatemala.

The Communists have extended their range and captured a following outside organized parties through front groups. They alleged 8 million signers for the Five-Power Peace Pact campaign in 1951 (about 5 percent of the area's population), and claim several millions of members of unions affiliated with the Communist-front Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). While these claims are greatly exaggerated, the Communists may have retained the latent sympathy of a million or more Latin Americans. Organizationally, they have succeeded in establishing reliable Communists in key positions in strategic labor unions and in national labor federations. The Com-

munists have also been able to penetrate Latin American educational systems, intellectual circles, and those patriotic organizations formed to give expression to the new spirit of ultranationalism. So long as Communist parties have cells in labor, student, intellectual, and nationalist groups, and Communist propaganda can play on their drives and discontents, as is now the case in many Latin American countries, Communist capabilities in the area are a factor with which to reckon.

II. OBJECTIVES

The Communist movement in Latin America has as its immediate overriding objective the location of political power in the hands of groups hostile to the United States. With this end in view the Communists are generally supporting any and all groups that pursue an anti-United States policy, including some that the Communists formerly denounced as Fascist and others that adopt an anti-United States line as a temporary expedient in the struggle for votes. The Communist alliance with Fascist-type political groups conflicts with Communist slogans in support of freedom and democracy which have been important symbols in the Communist propaganda offensive. Communist intransigence in demanding that political allies follow an anti-United States line also conflicts with the tendency of most political leaders to adopt a less extreme course once in power.

At the present time the Communist propaganda offensive is directed primarily against the military assistance agreements and participation of United States capital in the development of Latin American raw material resources. The Communists aim thereby to weaken Latin America's economic and military contribution to the West while spreading abroad a sinister picture of the United States as an exploiting, warmongering, imperialist power.

III. TACTICS

Latin American Communist parties have been following the strategy of the national liberation front with slogans barely distinguishable from those of most non-Communist progressive parties. The Communists present themselves as the vanguard of democracy fighting to give effect to objectives popularized by politicians seeking mass support—national independence, social justice, economic democracy, labor unity. In Communist propaganda these are made wholly dependent upon peace, elimination of imperialist (i. e., United States) exploitation, defeat of alleged United States plans to drag Latin America into war, and ousting of pro-United States leaders who are accused of conniving with United States monopolists and warmongers.

The execution of the national liberation front strategy varies with the local political climate and Communist strength. The Communists operate from an advantageous place within the administration coalition in Guatemala. In several countries they have sketched a policy of conditional support for regimes that are strongly nationalist and that the Communists hope will follow an anti-United States course. Elsewhere the Communist parties are in open opposition to the governments of the day. In general they pursue constitutional courses of action and only in Brazil and Colombia have Communist parties tended to abandon this line. Communist policy, whatever the Com-

munist political position of the day—within a government, in constitutional opposition, or in violent opposition—is consistent in two particulars: That is, in opposing political moderation that is necessary to orderly national development and in promoting anti-United States nationalism.

Under the "national liberation front" strategy, the Communists concentrate their efforts on social sectors that are active partisans of change—including labor, both manual and white-collar, professionals, especially writers and artists, and youth and women sectors of these groups. The primary Communist target groups are urban and they have grown in size and influence with the shift of population from rural to urban areas. The Communists would use influence gained in urban centers, as they are now doing in Guatemala, to promote radical agrarian reform, with the purpose of exploiting it for purely Communist objectives.

Front organizations to attract non-Communist support and extend the voice and audience of the Communist parties are of major importance to the tactics of Latin-American communism. The Communists organize labor, both urban and rural, youth-student groups, women, racial, and other front groups, using special appeals to each—labor unity, higher wages, agrarian reform, benefits to youth, women's suffrage. The special-interest groups are then deployed to support appeals that cut across class and group lines, such as "peace," nationalization of raw material resources, and the cancellation of infringements on sovereignty allegedly involved in collaboration with the United States. Latin-American Communists have received generous financial assistance from international Communist headquarters in the past 2 years in support of their program of developing front organizations. With this financing, the Latin-American Communists have organized trips for hundreds of fellow travelers as well as for Communists and a scattered few non-Communists to Communist front conferences in Europe and the Soviet orbit.

E. Communism in Asia

I. OBJECTIVES

The immediate short-term objectives of Communist movements in non-Communist Asia are conditioned by such factors as:

1. The military reverses suffered since 1951 by all Communist insurgent movements in Asia, except the Viet Minh in Indochina, and the adverse repercussions of the Japanese Communist tactics of violence in the first half of 1952.
2. The growing coalescence of non-Communist forces in many parts of Asia.
3. The demonstrated Western determination to resist further Communist inroads, particularly those involving identifiable aggression of the Korean type.
4. The existence in Asia, despite the above factors, of actual or potential areas of general susceptibility to Communist appeals.

The above factors appear to have led since about 1951 to a re orientation of immediate Communist objectives and tactics in Asia. After 1946 armed uprisings were initiated in some southeast Asian areas, although earlier efforts to create "coalition" regimes and

negotiate continued. By 1948 these uprisings had developed into a general offensive, with Communist uprisings in every country in southeast Asia except Thailand. The objectives and strategy of armed struggle were given public formulation at the 1949 Peiping conference of Asian and Australasian trade unions and found their most extreme expression in the Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950. Since the failure of the Communist offensives in Korea in the spring of 1951 there have been no corresponding efforts to extend the area of Communist control in Asia except for the continuing offensives in Indochina. Although armed struggle continues in every country except Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia, Communist tactics are designed primarily to neutralize or deny to the West areas of non-Communist control and to conserve and strengthen Communist forces for operations in the indefinite future.

Specifically, short-term Communist objectives in Asia include the following:

1. *The conservation of existing military potentials wherever possible.*—This may include efforts to maintain hard-pressed military formations through political means (negotiations or offers of conditional cooperation with former enemies). It may involve the secretion of caches of arms, the creation of covert "hard core" military or paramilitary formations, and where possible the evacuation of insurgent forces to "base areas" made relatively secure by geographic isolation or propinquity to Communist China. In Indochina, where the Communists have the most favorable military prospects, this tactic includes efforts to seize additional territory combined with efforts to create consolidated areas of Communist strength around existing bases.

2. *Reduction of Asian cooperation with the West and of Asian determination to resist communism.*—This includes opposition to the acceptance of United States military and economic aid, to bilateral or regional defense arrangements, and to restrictions on trade and diplomatic intercourse with Communist China and the U. S. S. R. It also includes the diversion of "neutralist" tendencies among Asians into pro-Soviet, pro-Communist channels, and emphasis on the economic and other gains to be derived from cooperation with Communist countries. Indigenous Communist movements and the Communist bloc will be pictured as having only "peaceful" objectives and tactics, and their willingness to cooperate with non-Communists will be stressed. The Communists may make efforts to weaken pro-Western or anti-Communist governments through expedient political maneuvers and cooperation with opposition groups of whatever political persuasion.

3. *Creation of a potential for future operations.*—Throughout its current activities, each Communist movement in Asia is aware of the need to maintain a tightly disciplined party and to avoid alliances that restrict party independence.

4. *Support of world Communist policies.*—Each national Communist movement is obligated to support world Communist objectives by all means at its disposal, including espionage activities, aid to insurgent or party groups in adjoining countries, and participation in world Communist propaganda activities.

The Communist movements of the area appear to be operating at the present in pursuit of short-term, limited objectives that are fairly well in accord with actual conditions in the individual countries.

The parties are not being asked to engage in costly or suicidal military adventures to further some broader world Communist objective, nor have they so far been asked to initiate a strategic retreat that might in individual cases represent a sacrifice of major objectives already gained. This does not mean, however, that the individual parties are pursuing purely national objectives. The individual parties continue to be enjoined to support all actions of the Soviet bloc, even if these should appear prejudicial to the national interests of individual countries or to the "peaceful" pose a party may be trying to assume. Beyond this, the individual parties are apparently obligated to assign top priority to the objective of preventing or minimizing the effectiveness of Asian cooperation with the West in order to "neutralize" non-Communist Asia in the East-West struggle. It is conceivable that the primacy of this objective may occasionally prevent the Communists from extending their influence among groups with a mild anti-Soviet or pro-United States bias but otherwise susceptible to Communist propaganda. Conversely, the Communists may occasionally collaborate with right-wing groups which are inimical to other Communist objectives but exhibit "neutralist" or anti-United States tendencies.

II. TACTICS

A. Variation in tactics from country to country

In attempting to further their current objectives, the national Communist movements of Asia are resorting to a wide range of tactical devices:

1. *Indonesia.*—The party operates overtly, is represented in the provisional parliament, and has offered its qualified support to the government of Premier Wilopo. The party dominates the trade union movement, but has recently chosen not to exercise even its limited potential for disruption and violence.

2. *Burma.*—The party is continuing the rebellion begun in 1948, and is attempting to create an effective united front of insurgent groups and to concentrate its military activities in secure base areas. However, the party has suffered military reverses and has made repeated conditional overtures to the Government for a cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Communist elements also operate aboveground and are represented in Parliament through the Communist-controlled Burma Workers and Peasants Party.

3. *Malaya.*—The Communist movement operates primarily among the Chinese half of the population and has been in open rebellion since 1948. The Communists have recently appeared to modify their guerrilla tactics to reduce terroristic actions likely to arouse popular antipathy. The party is reportedly planning to extend its efforts to infiltrate non-Communist organizations of all types.

4. *Philippines.*—The party is engaged in open rebellion through its military arm, the People's Liberation Army (HMB). Following recent cease-fire and amnesty feelers by HMB and party leaders, local negotiations between the Government and the insurgents reportedly have taken place. The party is reportedly attempting to shift the emphasis of its activities from guerrilla warfare to other covert and overt activities, including infiltration into non-Communist organizations.

5. *Thailand.*—The most effective part of the Thai Communist movement operates among the 3 million Chinese. The movement among the Thais is small and ineffectual, limited primarily to propaganda activities. It alone among southeast Asian parties did not initiate an insurrection in the 1946–48 period.

6. *Indochina.*—In Communist-controlled areas, the Communist (Laodong) Party operates much as do Communist parties in other Communist-bloc areas. In the areas controlled by the Governments of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, on the other hand, the Communists operate covertly, with emphasis on subversion, infiltration, intimidation, propaganda, and other activities in support of the Indochinese rebellion.

7. *Japan.*—The party has responded to a steady decline in strength and influence, to increased government suppression, and to the adverse reaction occasioned by its resort to violence during the first half of 1952, by shifting its emphasis to "legal" activities. The party campaigned vigorously in the 1952 and 1953 general elections and has sought to stress those objectives it holds in common with other groups in opposition to the Yoshida government. At the same time the party has been engaged in the creation of an effective and disciplined underground organization, including paramilitary units.

B. Common features of tactics throughout region

Despite the diversity of military and political devices used by the Communist movements in Asia, ranging from legal parliamentary activities to a full-scale modern war, there are certain underlying factors common to the tactics of most of the movements described above:

1. *Armed struggle.*—The methods of guerrilla warfare developed by the Communists in China and elsewhere underlie Communist tactics throughout Asia. Armed struggle is a key concept in the Communist strategy for seizing power in areas like Asia; indeed it is to be questioned whether orthodox Communists consider seizure and consolidation of power possible without ultimate resort to violence. Even in areas where actual insurrection may be in abeyance, as in Japan or Indonesia, or where it may be deemphasized in favor of other tactics, as in Burma or the Philippines, the probability that "armed struggle" will eventually come to the fore is basic to Communist political warfare tactics.

2. *United front and unified action.*—At the present time in Asia, except in Indochina, the armed struggle aspect of Communist tactics is receding into the background, and nonmilitary means of political warfare calculated to achieve the objectives outlined under (I) above, are coming into the fore. Nonviolent Communist tactics are now no longer aimed merely at supporting a military struggle and disrupting governmental processes; the Communists may even go so far as to lend their conditional support to groups that are basically anti-Communist but at the same time potentially antiwestern or neutralist.

It is becoming clear that in Asia the Communists have not entered into united front tactics with the same sense of urgency that characterized the united front of 1935. The Communists, for example, have not sacrificed major elements of their revolutionary program, have not entered into significant strategic retreats, and have not fully

abandoned armed struggle. Nor have they formed or offered to form alliances with non-Communist groups except under conditions of virtual surrender to at least a part of the Communist program.

The Communists in Asia are now posing as the defenders of national independence against the threat of Western and United States aggression as represented by United States and Western military and economic aid, efforts to create anti-Communist alliances, and restrictions on trade and other relations with the Communist bloc. Similarly, the Communists are posing as the only true defenders of peace. On the domestic scene this takes the form of demands that operations against Communist insurgents should cease. On the international scene the defense of peace is in terms of opposition to Western anti-Communist policies. The Communists are engaged in creating in each country a united front in support of the slogans of national independence and peace, but only groups accepting the Communist definition of these slogans are admitted, with the result that the united front remains Communist-controlled without significant independent participation. Organizationally the united front takes the form of peace movements and loose organizations of various Communist-led parties, trade unions, etc., in none of which Communist control is effectively masked.

Beyond the comparatively narrow concept of a united front the Communists in Asia are participating in unified actions to achieve specific objectives in cooperation with non-Communists, without sacrificing Communist organizational and tactical independence. Under this concept, Communist insurgents in Burma have offered their qualified cooperation to the Government to engage in joint military operations against the Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, and Communists in Indonesia have offered their qualified support to the Wilopo government. In Japan, the party has campaigned vigorously in the elections of 1952 and 1953, stressing those objectives it holds in common with other opposition parties, both left and right. The concept of unified action makes it possible for Asian Communists to work within organizations such as trade unions, even if these are controlled by non-Communists or otherwise ineligible or unwilling to participate in a formal united front.

The tactics of united front and unified action have not been fully developed in Asia, but they are sufficiently widespread, under a variety of names, to suggest that they will be generally resorted to as local conditions permit.

3. *International coordination.*—The diversity of tactics and the Communist regard for local conditions in Asia should not be taken to imply that international coordination of the Communist movements of the area is confined to the generalized coordination of objectives described in section (I) above. The coordination extends also to specific local Communist activities, most of which are linked to a corresponding world Communist tactic or program.

Communist-led insurrections, particularly in Malaya and Indochina, are thus described in Communist propaganda as akin to the Korean war and part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Communist efforts to obtain cease-fire or amnesties for insurgents are linked to world peace campaigns. Communist efforts to relax restrictions on trade and other intercourse with the Communist bloc are

linked to Soviet coexistence propaganda, as are local united front and unified action campaigns.

The international coordination illustrated by such examples serves to give diverse activities a unified theme and helps to break the isolation of individual Communist movements by linking them to a worldwide movement. The Communists lose no opportunity to demonstrate the worldwide support of individual nationwide Communist-sponsored activities.

The Communist movements in Asia are aided in the pursuit of their present objectives by the fact that Communist China provides a secure base for leadership, coordination, advice, and material aid that lies beyond the range of the individual Asian governments, and by the fact that the slogans and causes currently espoused by the Communists have a wide appeal in Asia. At the same time, the Communist movements have to reckon with a widespread fear in Asia of the expansive aspects of international communism, as represented by the Soviet Union and China, and with growing suspicions of indigenous Communist motives created by the repeated shifts in Communist policies (from coalition to armed struggle to peace) and by demonstrations of the international loyalties of individual Communist movements. The impact of local Communist movements and their resources in arms, men, and propaganda themes varies widely from country to country. In general, the strength, determination, and stability of Asian non-Communist governments has significantly reduced the strength of indigenous Communists. However, international developments could at any time reverse a favorable trend. In the final analysis, the potential of international communism in Asia will depend upon a combination of local and international factors: the effectiveness of western policy in Asia; local military, economic, and political conditions; developments in the Indochinese and Korean wars; the level and character of Chinese Communist aid to Communist groups; and developments in the cold war both in Asia and outside the region.

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